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I. THE POLITICAL MISE-EN-SCENE AND ITS
RELATION TO THE LEGALITY OF VENEZUELA’S
WITHDRAWAL – A PRELIMINARY APPRAISAL
The legal issues arising from the Government of Venezuela’s
(GOV) withdrawal from the Organization of American States (OAS)
are complex and unprecedented. The political context, however, is
strikingly familiar since the promotion of democracy has been
arguably the most debated issue in international politics during the
last quarter-century.1 On the other hand, this very typical political
conflict is also premised on a sui generis legal debate, for the
political conflict in the eyes of many is, at root, over the fundamental
issue of Venezuela’s internal governance and whether or not
1. See generally CONDOLEEZZA RICE, DEMOCRACY: STORIES FROM THE LONG
ROAD TO FREEDOM 6-7 (2017) (discussing case studies of democratic advance, and
some studies of retrenchment, albeit without discussing Venezuela).
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democracy can be an enforceable international legal obligation.
Sovereignty and non-intervention, based on a history of European
and U.S. interference in the internal affairs of Latin American states,
raise issues of fundamental concern freighted by history and
memory. Venezuela’s potential non-compliance with the provisions
of the Inter-American Democratic Charter (Democratic Charter), a
resolution adopted on September 11, 2001, by the General Assembly
of the OAS,2 and the OAS response was an invitation to crises.
A brief statement of the most recent events that eroded democracy
in Venezuela is in order. Leading the Bolivarian Revolutionary
Party, President Hugo Chavez took measures to expand the powers
of the executive branch of the GOV, including sponsoring a
successful referendum in 2009 ending presidential term limits and
reducing the powers of other branches of the GOV, including seizing
control of the Supreme Court by increasing its size and packing its
membership with supporters.
Increasing resistance to this
consolidation of power on January 16, 2016, coupled with the less
charismatic leadership of Chavez’s successor, Nicolas Maduro,
culminated in the ruling party’s loss of its majority in the Venezuelan
legislature, further increasing tensions between the opposition and
the GOV.3 In response to these anti-democratic measures, on May
30, 2016, the OAS Secretary General, Uruguayan Luis Almagro,
submitted an extensive report to the OAS Permanent Council
detailing the threat to democracy in Venezuela and requesting a
special meeting of the OAS Permanent Council pursuant to the terms
of the Democratic Charter.4 As requested, the meeting was held on
June 23, 2016, but no actions were taken5 since the proposed
2. See Organization of American States, Inter-American Democratic Charter,
Sept. 11, 2000, 40 I.L.M. 1289 (establishing the provisions of the OAS Democratic
Charter).
3. See Claire Felter & Daniella Renwick, Venezuela in Crisis, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN REL., https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/venezuela-crisis (last updated
Aug. 1, 2017) (explaining Venezuela’s political crisis and tensions within the
country under the leadership of Nicolas Maduro).
4. Organization of American States Secretary-General, Report to the
Permanent Council, OSG/243-16 (May 30, 2016) (stating concerns regarding
democracy in Venezuela and requesting a meeting of the Permanent Council on
this regard).
5. Carol Morello, OAS Head Calls for Recall of Maduro to Restore
Democracy in Spiraling Venezuela, WASH. POST (June 23, 2016),
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activation of the provisions of the Democratic Charter fell three votes
short of the required three-fourths majority.6 On December 2, 2016,
the Foreign Ministers of Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay,
in a joint letter from Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR),
suspended Venezuela, a MERCOSUR member since 2012, for
failure to implement MERCOSUR obligations,7 including
commitments to democracy in language similar to that of the
Democratic Charter.8
However, on February 21, 2017,
MERCOSUR’s Parliament of the South (PARLASUR) rejected this
determination and appealed to MERCOSUR’s Permanent Review
Tribunal.9 But then, on March 29, the Venezuelan Supreme Court
briefly dissolved the National Assembly, an order revoked days later
after international outcry.10 On March 14, Secretary General
Almagro submitted another detailed report calling for a special
meeting to consider Venezuela’s suspension from the OAS, again
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/oas-head-calls-forrecall-of-maduro-to-restore-democracy-in-spiraling-venezuela/2016/06/23/1568
edcc-3974-11e6-a254-2b336e293a3c_story.html?utm_term=.c1131819cdd8.
6. See Luis Alonso Lugo & Joshua Goodman, OAS Head Urges Bloc Suspend
Venezuela Over Elections, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 15, 2017),
https://apnews.com/fa4dd75d8cfb4472a54114d80f93536a/oas-head-urges-blocsuspend-venezuela-over-elections (explaining that the suspension of a state from
the OAS requires the support of two-thirds of 34 member states and that the
Venezuela vote was just shy of this requirement).
7. Mercosur Suspends Venezuela Over Trade and Human Rights, BBC
WORLD NEWS (Dec. 2, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america38181198 (stating that the founding members suspended Venezuela’s membership
for not meeting basic standards).
8. See Protocol De Montevideo Sobre Compromiso Con La Democracia En El
Mercosur [Protocol of Montevideo on the Commitment to Democracy in
Mercosur] art. 11 (Dec. 20, 2011), http://www.mercosur.int/innovaportal/file/
2485/1/ushuaia_ii.pdf (expressing the requirements of democracy similar to the
OAS Democratic Charter).
9. Lucas Koerner, MERCOSUR Parliament Rejects Suspension of Venezuela,
VENEZUELA ANALYSIS, https://venezuelanalysis.com/news/12941 (last updated
Feb. 22, 2017, 3:33 PM) (explaining that PARLASUR rejected the decision on the
assumption that it had no legal basis).
10. See Michael Shifter, Venezuela’s Bad Neighbor Policy: Why It Quit the
Organization of American States, FOREIGN AFF. (May 5, 2017),
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/venezuela/2017-05-05/venezuelas-badneighbor-policy (explaining how a Venezuelan Supreme Court decision closed
down the National Assembly, which was dominated by the opposition, leading to
massive protests).
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pursuant to the provisions of the Democratic Charter.11 In the view
of some, Venezuela beat the OAS to the punch by withdrawing
before it could be suspended.12
This brief description establishes the political centrality of the
Democratic Charter to the legal issues that have been raised by
Venezuela’s withdrawal. While it may appear that the GOV’s
compliance with the Democratic Charter is no longer at issue, the
better view, as this Essay will argue, is that the GOV’s withdrawal
from the OAS, if anything, now exacerbates the tension between the
OAS and the GOV over Venezuela’s compliance with the
Democratic Charter. This is because the escalation or de-escalation
of the continuing legal and political dispute between the OAS and
the GOV over the next two years, the earliest time the withdrawal
can take effect, turns on the interpretation the Charter of the
Organization of American States (OAS Charter)13 and whether or not
compliance with the Democratic Charter remains relevant to the
withdrawal process.
A close reading of the text reveals why this is so. The OAS
Charter’s withdrawal clause, Article 143, provides:
The present Charter shall remain in force indefinitely, but may be
denounced by any Member State upon written notification to the General
Secretariat, which shall communicate to all the others each notice of
denunciation received. After two years from the date on which the
General Secretariat receives a notice of denunciation, the present Charter
shall cease to be in force with respect to the denouncing State, which shall
cease to belong to the Organization after it has fulfilled the obligations
arising from the present Charter.14

While the clause confusingly uses the term “denunciation,” the
11. See Organization of American States Secretary-General, Report to the
Organization of American States, OSG/128-17, at 5 (Mar. 14, 2017) [hereinafter
OAS 2017 Report] (stating that Article 20 of the Charter calls for a Special Session
of the General Assembly and Article 21 authorizes possible suspension of a state
when the diplomatic interventions to restore democracy described in Articles 17-19
have failed).
12. Shifter, supra note 10.
13. Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T.
2394.
14. Id. at 2436.
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term in its context is essentially equivalent to the term “withdrawal,”
which will be used henceforth in this discussion.15 What is clear,
however, is that the clause specifically provides that the withdrawing
state shall “cease to belong” to the OAS “after it has fulfilled the
obligations arising from the present Charter.” This raises the
question of whether the Democratic Charter is included among “the
obligations arising from the present Charter,” and, if so, questions
further whether or not Venezuela’s purported withdrawal can be
effective if the GOV has not complied with the Democratic Charter.
To this end, these questions also consider any possible effects of a
finding of noncompliance by the OAS itself.
OAS has not made findings under the Democratic Charter,
although the Secretary General’s position is clear. His views,
however, raise a number of questions. Does the Democratic
Charter’s provisions ex proprio vigore operate to permit a legal
conclusion that Venezuela is not now in compliance and must take
remedial measures in order to satisfy the terms of the withdrawal
clause? If not, could the political organs of OAS during the two-year
contemplated by the withdrawal clause make determinations and
impose additional specific obligations on Venezuela, which at
present remains a member of OAS and bound by OAS laws, that the
GOV would be required to perform before withdrawal can take
effect? Would the GOV instead have the self-judging authority to
determine the obligations it needs to perform and whether or not they
have been performed for the purpose of the withdrawal’s
effectiveness albeit, perhaps, not for other purposes? Even if the
GOV were the final judge of the scope of the withdrawal clause and
whether or not those obligations had been performed, would a
suspension of the GOV, pursuant to the Democratic Charter, render
ineffective, tolled, or in some way operate as an estoppel against the
GOV’s actual implementation of its withdrawal? While theoretically
engaging, each of these questions turn on the threshold question of
15. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 56, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 332 (relying on Article 56 concerning “Denunciation of or withdrawal
from a treaty containing no provision regarding termination, denunciation or
withdrawal” which treats the two terms as equivalent); ANTHONY AUST, MODERN
TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 277 (2d ed. 2007) (explaining the uses of both
“denunciation” and “withdrawal” in relation to multilateral treaties).
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whether, within the meaning of Article 143, the Democratic Charter
is an obligation “arising from” the Charter.16
Arguably, however, Venezuela appears to imply that the question
does not arise since its withdrawal might be deemed a remedial
measure responding to an OAS breach of legal obligation. To begin
with, on April 27 and 28, 2017, when the GOV purported to give
notice of its intent to withdraw by means of a diplomatic note from
its Permanent Representative to the OAS with an attached letter from
Venezuelan President Maduro to OAS Secretary General Almagro,17
it characterized OAS’s behavior in strident terms.18 The true reasons
for the decision will remain a matter of debate in diplomatic history.
However, the letter from Venezuelan President Maduro drew special
attention to the April 26 special meeting of the OAS Permanent
Council. Held in response to the Secretary General’s request for
Venezuela’s suspension in his March 14 report to the Permanent
Council, this meeting, in Maduro’s view:,
was held to effect a reprise, this time with Bolivarian Venezuela, of the
Organization’s immorally orchestrated persecution of the worthy Cuban
Revolution, using the self-same [sic] mechanism of calling a Meeting of
Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs as that which, in 1962, led to
Cuba’s expulsion from the OAS and prompted Commander Fidel Castro
to coin his now famous expression, dubbing the Organization the
“Ministry of the Colonies.”19

President Maduro claims that the GOV is simply responding
defensively to some prior threat or unlawful act by the OAS, perhaps
even acting as a proxy for the United States.
President Maduro’s characterization of what occurred in the
“Cuban Case” is, however, contestable on at least two grounds.
First, while a special Meeting of Consultation of Minister of Foreign
16. Charter of the Organization of American States, supra note 13, at 2436.
17. OEA/Ser.G CP/INF. 7707/17 (Apr. 28, 2017) [hereinafter Venezuela Letter
Denouncing the OAS].
18. Id.
19. Id.; see also Mark Weisbrot, Venezuela and the OAS: The Logic of
Withdrawal, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 28, 2017), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
entry/venezuela-and-the-oas-the-logic-of-withdrawal_us_590389c8e4b084
f59b49f8b5 (“The OAS intervention is difficult to see as anything other than a
partisan, Washington-driven initiative.”).
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Affairs occurred in 1962, addressing Cuba, it is not clear that the
effect of that meeting resulted in Cuba’s “expulsion.”20 Instead it
was the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers at
Punta del Este, Uruguay that “suspended” Cuba’s participation in
OAS activities.21 Second, the formal decision to suspend Cuba
occurred by request of the Colombian Government which claimed,
not that Cuba had violated OAS norms with respect to democracy,
but rather that Cuba had violated its collective security obligations
under the OAS Charter by encouraging and supporting subversive
guerilla activities in Latin American countries including Colombia.22
By contrast, as the timing of its notice of withdrawal suggests, the
GOV’s rationale for seeking to withdraw from OAS may be in order
to avoid sanctions under the Democratic Charter, rather than
sanctions, at least at present, for current violations of collective
security obligations. The GOV beat OAS to the punch, so to speak,
by initiating withdrawal before suspension. At the same time, the
threat of withdrawal through the giving of notice may serve to deter
OAS from exercising any rights it may have to sanction the GOV
during the period in which the GOV could, following negotiations
with the OAS, still revoke or suspend its notice of withdrawal.23
In sum, Venezuela’s withdrawal is not a justified response to some
prior unlawful aggressive act by OAS. Thus, for purposes of
analysis, this Essay proceeds on two assumptions. First, that OAS,
both prior to the GOV’s notice of withdrawal and thereafter, could
have determined that the GOV was not in compliance with the terms
of the Democratic Charter. Second, that the effectiveness of the
20. Contra RUBÉN M. PERINA, THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES AS
THE ADVOCATE AND GUARDIAN OF DEMOCRACY: AN INSIDER’S CRITICAL
ASSESSMENT OF ITS ROLE IN PROMOTING AND DEFENDING DEMOCRACY 39 (2015)

(finding that the 8th meeting actually resulted in Cuba’s suspension from the
OAS).
21. Id. (stating that the Eighth Meeting of Consultation suspended Cuba from
the OAS due to the Cuban government’s support of subversive activities by
communist guerillas in other Latin American countries).
22. See id. at 39-40 (reporting also the decision of the Ninth Consultative
Meeting of Foreign Ministers in 1964, condemning Cuba’s aggression and
intervention, confirming Cuba’s suspension, and agreeing to break diplomatic
relations between OAS Member States (with the exception of Mexico and Cuba)).
23. See infra Part IV (analogizing to the case of North Korea’s withdrawal
from the NPT).
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GOV’s withdrawal, therefore, depends exclusively on the meaning of
Article 143. More precisely, in terms of the language of the OAS
Charter, now that the GOV has given the notice required under
Article 143, and Article 143’s two-year clock has therefore begun to
tick, the question arises of what exactly are the “obligations arising
from the present Charter” that the GOV must “fulfill” before its
withdrawal can take effect. Do these obligations include the
Democratic Charter?
Already the GOV explicitly, and elements of the OAS implicitly,
have taken conflicting positions on this threshold issue. The GOV’s
initial position appears to be that it must merely pay its delinquent
dues,24 while at least some elements of the Venezuelan internal
opposition hold otherwise.25 Also, statements by the OAS Legal
Advisor, which may reflect the OAS Secretariat’s position
generally,26 suggest the OAS General Assembly or Permanent
Council, the organs that represent the Member States, may
eventually feel legally authorized to take the position that the GOV
must do more than pay off its debts to effect withdrawal. The matter
is not free from doubt,27 and the wisdom of the OAS’s taking such a
24. Orlando Avendaño, Venezuela Announces Withdrawal from ProDemocracy Organization of American States, PANAM POST (Apr. 27, 2017, 10:31
AM), https://panampost.com/orlando-avendano/2017/04/27/venezuela-announceswithdrawal-from-pro-democracy-organization-of-american-states/.
25. Id. (“Despite Rodriguez’s threats, opposition Congressman Delsa
Solorzano stated: ‘The only way we can no longer be part of these multilateral
organizations would be through a constitutional reform,’ which is why
‘Venezuela’s eventual withdrawal from the OAS does not seem valid.’”).
26. See Venezuela necesitaría dos años y pagar la deuda de 8,7 millones de
dólares para dejar la OEA [Venezuela Would Need Two Years and to Pay the Debt
of 8.7 Million Dollars to Leave the OAS], EFE (Apr. 26, 2017),
http://www.efe.com/efe/america/portada/venezuela-necesitaria-dos-anos-y-pagarla-deuda-de-8-7-millones-dolares-para-dejar-oea/20000064-3249317 (reporting on
a statement by OAS Legal Adviser Jean Michel Arrighi that “Esas obligaciones no
son solo económicas, ya que la Carta de la OEA estipula que los países miembros
deben respetar la democracia representativa, los derechos humanos, la separación
de poderes y la libertad de expression” [“These obligations are not only economic,
since the Charter provides that members must respect representative democracy,
human rights, separation of powers, liberty of expression”]).
27. See Alonso Illueca, The Venezuela Crisis at the Organization of American
States: Between Withdrawal and Suspension, OPINIO JURIS BLOG (May 29, 2017,
4:19 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2017/05/29/the-venezuela-crisis-at-the-organ
ization-of-american-states-between-withdrawal-and-suspension/ (“[It] could be
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legal position as a matter of legal-policy to the extent it has legal
discretion to interpret the withdrawal clause broadly or narrowly is
also a matter that requires serious reflection in light of the range of
options for promoting democracy in the Americas.
Part II of this Essay now turns to an exhaustive analysis of the
scope of the withdrawal clause in three phases. First, it analyzes the
text and negotiating history of the withdrawal clause in the original
OAS Charter of 1948 in light of the Charter’s overall structure.
Second, it analyzes the rise of democracy as a legal obligation under
the OAS Charter, culminating in the Democratic Charter as arguably
an authoritative interpretation of the current OAS Charter. Third, it
synthesizes the original withdrawal clause and the subsequent OAS
law on democracy to provide narrow and broad interpretations of the
scope of the current withdrawal clause suggesting there is room for
discretion in interpretation based on policy considerations. Part III,
drawing on scholarship in international law and international
relations theory, then analyzes the relevant criteria for characterizing
competing models for institutionalizing commitments to democracy,
and, in light of these criteria, it explores case studies of both “soft”
and “hard” commitments to democracy drawing on examples from
U.S. constitutional history which are of special relevance in
explaining the shift from the OAS Charter’s initially “soft”
commitment to its current arguably “harder,” commitment to
democracy. Part IV then draws on rational choice theory to examine
the purpose and effects of moving along the continuum of
legalization described in Part III. It offers a general account of the
role of withdrawal clauses, both ex ante and ex post, in encouraging
and preserving international commitments, and it draws on the case
study of North Korea’s withdrawal from the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT).28 It uses the response of NPT member
states to illustrate the counter-intuitive argument that excessively
“strong” institutionalization of a commitment, and the correlative
argued that among the obligations for Venezuela arising from the [OAS] Charter
are the ones supporting representative democracy. Nonetheless, considering that
this is the first time that a State withdraws from the OAS, there are no factual
precedents on which to draw upon.”).
28. See Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for
signature July 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, [hereinafter NPT].
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assertion of an expansive legal position can ultimately erode the
quality of, and degree of adherence to, the challenged norm - in that
case, continuing international supervision of the nuclear activities of
North Korea, and, moreover, other potentially withdrawing states in
the future. This Essay applies these insights to the legal-policy
choice now facing the OAS and its Member States in connection
with Venezuela’s notice of withdrawal. Part V concludes with a plea
for restraint and prudence to avoid further harm to democratic norms
in the Americas.

II. THE LAW OF THE OAS WITHDRAWAL
CLAUSE
In accordance with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(VCLT), all treaty interpretation begins with the text.29 The OAS
withdrawal clause contains a unique formulation nominally
conditioning the effectiveness of withdrawal to a Member State
having also “fulfilled the obligations arising from the present
Charter.”30 Unlike the American Convention on Human Rights, it
does not merely preserve rights that accrued from a breach of
obligation through acts of the withdrawing state that occurred while
the treaty was still in force for the withdrawing state,31 a rule that
simply confirms the default rule under the law of state
responsibility.32 Nor does it cut back on the protection of accrued
29. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 15, at 340
(stating in Article 31 that “a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and
in light of its object and purpose”).
30. Charter of the Organization of American States, supra note 13, at 2436.
31. See Organization of American States, American Convention on Human
Rights art. 78, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 144 (“Such a denunciation shall not
have the effect of releasing the State Party concerned from the obligations
contained in this Convention with respect to any act that may constitute a violation
of those obligations and that has been taken by that state prior to the effective date
of denunciation.”); see also Roodal v. Trindad & Tobago, Case 12.342, Inter-Am.
Comm’n H.R., Report No. 89/01, OEA/Ser./L/V/II.114 Doc. 5 rev. ¶¶ 13-15
(2001) (applying the Article 78(2) provision by the Inter-American Commission to
the case of Trinidad and Tobago).
32. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 15, at 349;
see infra Part IV (discussing Art. 70 further regarding the withdrawal and
denunciation of states from treaties); see also INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION’S
ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION, TEXT, AND COMMENTARIES
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rights, unlike the typical investment treaty which protects rights that
have accrued under a treaty for a specified period after withdrawal,
sometimes extending investor rights for decades.33 And, unlike
Article 317(2) of the Law of the Sea Convention, it does not preserve
only “financial and contractual obligations.”34 Rather, the text does
not refer to dues alone or any other subset of obligations. Instead, it
refers to “the obligations,”—i.e. a plurality of obligations—“arising
from” the “present Charter,”35 In short, the text alone suggests that
the relevant obligations are not limited by subject matter. Thus,
limiting the scope of the clause to unpaid dues, or any other subject
matter limitation or temporal limitation, would seem to be
inconsistent with the text.
However, the text does insist that the obligations must arise from
the instrument itself (and not, perhaps, some other body of law such
as customary international law). One might say the “present”
Charter means only the Charter of 1948. That, however, would
eliminate the right to withdraw from subsequent amendments, which
is implausible. The focus should be on whether the “arising from”
requirement must be limited to the precise text of the OAS Charter,
as amended, or does it include instruments such as resolutions or
other statements authoritatively interpreting the Charter, such as the
Democratic Charter? A matter that must be explained in light of the
history of the withdrawal clause and the implications of OAS Charter
amendments, such as the Protocol of Washington,36 strengthening the
194 (James Crawford ed., 2002) (explaining Article 29 of its articles on state
responsibility by relying on Article 70 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties to take an even stronger position protecting “accrued” rights with respect
to non-treaty obligations).
33. See generally J.W. Salacuse, The Emerging Global Regime for Investment,
51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 427, 471-72 (2010) (citing examples of when accrued rights
were protected following withdraw).
34. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 317(2), Dec. 10,
1982, (“A State shall not be discharged by reason of the denunciation from the
financial and contractual obligations which accrued while it was a Party to this
Convention, nor shall the denunciation affect any right, obligation or legal situation
of that State created through the execution of this Convention prior to its
termination for that State.”).
35. Charter of the Organization of American States, supra note 13, at 2436.
36. Protocol of Amendments to the Charter of the Organization of American
States art. I, Dec. 14, 1992, 33 I.L.M. 1005 [hereinafter Protocol of Washington]
(entered into at the Sixteenth Special Session of the General Assembly of the
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OAS’s commitment to democracy. While eight Member States have
not deposited instruments of ratification to the Protocol of
Washington, Venezuela is not among them and is therefore bound by
its terms pending withdrawal from OAS.37
To begin to fill these lacunae, this Section examines the origins of
the withdrawal clause. Next, it explicates the process through which
democracy was institutionalized within OAS. Finally, it identifies
the range of discretion available to legal-policy makers for
synthesizing the Charter’s law of withdrawal with its law of
democracy.

Organization of American States) (The following new article 9 is being added to
Chapter III of the Charter of the Organization of American states:
A Member of the whose democratically constituted government has
been overthrown by force my be suspended from the exercise of the
right to participate in the sessions of the General Assembly, the
Meeting of Consultation, the Councils of the Organization and the
Specialized Conferenced as well as in the commissions, working
groups and any other bodies established. (a) The power to suspend
shall be exercised only when such diplomatic initiatives undertaken
by the Organization for the purpose of prompting the restoration of
representative democracy in the affected Member State have been
unsuccessful; (b) The decision to suspend shall be adopted at a
special session of the General Assembly by an affirmative vote of
two-thirds of the Member States; (c) The suspension shall take effect
immediately following its approval by the General Assembly; (d) The
suspension notwithstanding, the Organization shall endeavor to
undertake additional diplomatic initiatives to contribute to the reestablishment of representative democracy in the affected Member
State; (e) The Member which has been subject to suspension shall
continue to fulfill its obligations to the Organization; (f) The General
Assembly may lift the suspension by a decision adopted with the
approval of two-thirds of Member States; (g) The powers referred to
in this article shall be exercised in accordance with this Charter.)
37. See General Information of the Treaty, ORG. AMERICAN STATES
[hereinafter Protocol of Washington: General Information of the Treaty],
https://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_A-56_Protocol_of_Washington_sign.htm
(last
visited Oct. 6, 2017).
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A. THE NATURE OF THE WITHDRAWAL CLAUSE UNDER
THE 1948 CHARTER
The reason behind the withdrawal clause sets the context for
explaining the precise form the withdrawal clause took. Consistent
with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT)
guidance, treaty language should be interpreted in light of its
“context.”38 Also, where a treaty’s meaning is “ambiguous or
obscure,” the VCLT provides that “recourse may be had to
supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory
work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion.”39 In this
connection, two related circumstances for the original OAS Charter’s
drafting are critical. First, the radical break from past InterAmerican practice represented by the decision to produce and
organic instrument for the Inter-American system, and second, the
relationship between the Charter and the UN. The UN Charter of
1945, of course, has no withdrawal clause, which resulted in some
dispute when Indonesia attempted to withdraw in 1965 only to return
in 1966.40 For the Latin Americans meeting in Bogota, Colombia in
1948, the absence of a withdrawal clause in the UN Charter was an
anomaly made necessary only by a political imperative.41
More importantly, the debate over the withdrawal clause was
ultimately related to the decision, which was a radical departure from
the previously less formal Inter-American system, to create an
organic instrument - the OAS Charter. Because the proposed Charter
was conceived as, and by its own terms became, a “regional
organization” contemplated by Chapter VIII of the UN Charter,42 the
38. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 15, at 340 (stating
also, in Article 31(1), terms should be interpreted “[i]n light of [the terms’] context
and in light of [the treaty’s] object and purpose”).
39. Id. (Article 32).
40. See Egon Schwelb, Withdrawal from the United Nations: The Indonesian
Intermezzo, 61 AM. J. INT’L L. 661, 661 (1967) (discussing the confusion and
controversy resulting from the absence of a withdrawal provision in the Charter of
the United Nations).
41. See infra Section II.A.2.
42. Compare U.N. Charter arts. 52-54 [hereinafter UN Charter] (providing for
the existence of regional arrangements as authorized and overseen by the United
Nations Security Council); with Charter of the Organization of American States,
supra note 13, arts. 1-2. (specifically contemplating the OAS’s role as a Chapter
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question of withdrawal assumed greater significance. The original
design of the proposed comprehensive constitutive instrument for
what became the OAS and its nexus with the UN are thus relevant to
understanding the content of the “obligations” of Member States
under the withdrawal clause.
In light of this preliminary background, this Section now describes
the debate over the structure of the Inter-American legal system and
then locates the drafting of the withdrawal clause in the context of
that debate.
VIII “regional” organization inextricably linked to the UN - Art. 1:
The American States establish by this Charter the international
organization that they have developed to achieve an order of peace
and justice, to promote their solidarity, to strengthen their
collaboration, and to defend their sovereignty, their territorial
integrity, and they independence. Within the United Nations, the
Organization of American States is a regional agency. The
Organization of American States has no powers other than those
expressly conferred upon it by this Charter, none of whole provisions
authorizes it to intervene in matters that are within the internal
jurisdictions of the Member States.
Art. 2:
The Organization of American States, in order to put into practice the
principles on which it is founded and to fulfill its regional obligations
under the Charter of the United Nations, proclaims the following
essential purposes: (a) To strengthen the peace and security of the
continent; (b) To promote and consolidate representative democracy,
with due respect for the principle of nonintervention; (c) To prevent
possible causes of difficulties and to ensure the pacific settlement of
disputes that may arise among the Member States; (d) To provide for
common action on the part of those States in the event of aggression;
(e) To seek the solution of political, juridical, and economic problems
that may arise among them; (f) To promote, by cooperative action,
their economic, social, and cultural development; (g) To eradicate
extreme poverty, which constitutes an obstacle to the full democratic
development of the peoples of the hemisphere; and (h) To achieve an
effective limitation of conventional weapons that will make it
possible to devote the largest amount of resources to the economic
and social development of the Member States.)
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1. The Legal Structure of the Inter-American System
Previously, the Inter-American system operated through a series of
conferences meeting within the umbrella of an overarching informal
concept of a Pan American Union. Beginning with a conference
convened in Washington in 1890, this so-called Pan American Union
operated, much like the pre-WTO General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, without a constitutive document establishing any
organization. Various bodies, such as the Inter-American Juridical
Committee emerged through this process to perform particular
functions but never within the context of a constitutive instrument. It
was only with the meeting of the Ninth Conference in 1948 in
Bogota, implementing Resolution IX of the Mexico City Conference
of 1945, which was in turn held in the shadow of the San Francisco
Conference drafting the UN Charter, that the Latin American states
turned to the task of drafting a constitutive instrument.43 Following
the instruction of the Mexico Conference, the states met in Rio de
Janeiro in 1947 to conclude a treaty implementing collective
security commitments, knows as the Rio Treaty. The then Director of
the Department of International Law of the Pan American Union,
Charles Fenwick, noted that the Rio Treaty’s preamble contemplated
a further treaty on an “Inter-American Peace System.”44 Among
documents submitted to the negotiators at Bogota were proposals
prepared by the Inter-American Juridical Committee for a draft
Charter45 and for the treaty contemplated by the Rio Treaty’s
preamble that would provide mechanisms for the peaceful resolution
of disputes in the Inter-American system, which came to be known
as the Pact of Bogota.46
Significantly, the draft Charter did not contain a provision for
withdrawal. The draft dispute resolution treaty did provide for
43. See Josef L. Kunz, The Bogota Charter of the Organization of American
States, 42 AM. J. INT’L L. 568, 569 (1948).
44. Charles G. Fenwick, The Ninth International Conference of American
States, 42 AM. J. INT’L L. 553, 554 (1948).
45. Proyecto De Pacto Constitutivo Del Sistema Interamericano [Constitutive
Pact of the Inter-American System], in DOCUMENTOS PRESENTADOS A LA NOVENA
CONFERENCIA INTERNACIONAL AMERICANA 237 (1948).
46. Proyecto De Sistema Interamericano De Paz [Inter-American Peace
System Project], in DOCUMENTOS PRESENTADOS A LA NOVENA CONFERENCIA
INTERNACIONAL AMERICANA 153 (1948).
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withdrawal upon a year’s notice but the withdrawal would have no
effect on pending proceedings commenced prior to the giving of
notice of withdrawal.47 Most importantly, as initially contemplated,
each of the subsidiary agreements, even including the already
concluded Rio Treaty, were to be annexed into the OAS Charter thus
linking all the elements of the Inter-American legal system into a
single constitution. According to U.S. delegate William Sanders, the
Mexican delegation, which later played a key role in the ultimate
negotiation of the OAS Charter withdrawal clause, was the foremost
advocate of this approach.48 Indeed, the U.S. delegate spoke of the
problems remaining in the same breadth as concerns about the
precise status of the Pact of Bogota and “establishing the relationship
of a withdrawing state in relation to” the dispute resolution
commitments and procedures of the Pact of Bogota.49 In other
words, withdrawal from the OAS Charter could have implications for
rights and duties under the related instruments, such as the dispute
resolution instrument. The conference, however, fearing the risk that
the organic pact would be subject to reservations because of
objections to the related agreements, decided that the OAS Charter
would be “self-contained,” a separate instrument free as possible of
problematic language that might give rise to treaty reservations.50
47. Id. at 167.
48. See William Sanders, The Organization of American States: Summary of
the Conclusions of the Ninth International Conference of American States, Bogota,
Colombia, March 30- May 2, 1948, 26 INT’L CONCILIATION 383, 386 (1948)
(explaining that the Mexican government advocated for a “single comprehensive
document that would be self-contained and not have to rely on subsidiary
documents.”).
49. See Acta de la Primera Parte de la Cuarta Sesión de la Comisión de la
Coordinación [Minutes of the First Part of the Fourth Session of the Committee on
Coordination], in 2 ACTAS Y DOCUMENTOS 507, 513 (1953) (“Primero, aclarar la
situación del Pacto de Bogotá, mientras entra en vigor la Carta de la Organización
de los Estados Americanos; segundo, establecer la situación del Estado que
denuncie la Carta, en cuanto a ese Pacto; y otro problema . . . en cuanto a la nota
que se refiere al Comité de Redacción.”).
50. Id. at 512-13 (highlighting the Uruguayan representative’s explanation
calling the Pact of Bogota for dispute resolution a separate agreement independent
of the Charter: “Fue eliminada porque en la Comisión de Trabajo no quisimos
hacer de este Tratado un instrumento anexo ala Carta de la Organización de los
Estados Americanos; para evitar reservas a esta ultima por razón del Tratado de
Soluciones Pacificas. Este es un tratado especial, independiente de la Carta.” The
Uraguayan representative added that the details would be resolved by the “Comité
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Much of this history seems to have been forgotten or concealed.
When President Truman submitted the OAS Charter to the U.S.
Senate for its advice and consent to ratification, his communication
to the Senate contained only shards of evidence suggesting some
degree of linkage between the various instruments. Oddly, President
Truman’s transmittal letter to the Senate did claim that the Mexican
delegate’s objective to integrating all elements of the Inter-American
system had actually prevailed, but the President noted only the
inclusion of a number of articles relating to “economic, social and
cultural cooperation, as well as provisions on security matters and on
the pacific settlement of disputes.”51 The Report of the Committee
on Foreign Relations also made clear that the OAS Council, under
the proposed Charter, could act as a “provisional organ of
consultation under the Rio Treaty,”52 thus partially linking the two
treaties in the form contemplated by the Mexican delegate’s agenda.
But there appears to be no other references in the U.S. ratification
history to the debate between those who wanted to avoid
complicating ratification and those, like the Mexican delegation, who
wanted to link the treaties formally into a unified system of regional
law.
de Redacción” -- that is to say, the Committee on Style or Editing -- which would
put the articles in final form. This approach was met with some resistance from the
U.S. Delegate, William Sanders, who suggested that the issue, which he described
as a “problem,” merited further consideration: “De este articulo surgen problemas
que, aunque son de orden puramente técnico, si complican un poco el Tratado.”
Sanders later observed: “The extent to which the principles, obligations, and
procedures of pacific settlement and collective machinery should be incorporated
in the pact or should be left for treatment in separate treaties was also debated in
this same connection. On this question it was decided to incorporate by reference
in the draft Pact [on pacific settlement] the Rio de Janeiro Treaty on Reciprocal
Assistance and to include in the Pact only the collective or consultative aspects of
pacific settlement, leaving the procedures or machinery for development in a
separate treaty.”); see also Texto Del Sistema Interamericano de Soluciones
Pacificas [Text of the Inter-American System of Pacific Solutions], in 6 ACTAS Y
DOCUMENTOS 83, 83, 91 (1953) (finding that the drafting committee did make the
changes adopted by the drafting body, eliminating language that would have made
the Pact of Bogota an annex of the OAS Charter).
51. Harry S. Truman, Special Message to the Senate Transmitting Charter of
the Organization of American States, in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1, 97
(1949) [hereinafter President’s Letter of Transmittal of OAS Charter].
52. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 81ST CONG., REP. ON EX. A, THE
CHARTER OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES 8 (1950).
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Yet, this larger debate sheds light on the purpose behind the
precise wording of the withdrawal clause, in which the Mexican
delegation arguably sought to regain to some degree what it had lost
in the larger debate. That said, the only reference to the withdrawal
clause in the U.S. ratification debate merely quoted its language,
stating it was based on an Argentine proposal but without reference
to the role, as described in the next section below, of the Mexican
delegation in fundamentally transforming the Argentine proposal
into the sui generis language of the adopted clause.53
2. The Right of Withdrawal in the Context of the
Inter-American System
None of the eighty-seven articles in the preparatory document
submitted to the conference provided for a right to withdraw from
the proposed OAS Charter.54 The Argentine representative then
proposed an eighty-eighth article, providing, in pertinent part, that
“one year after the [Pan American Union] receives notice of
denunciation from any of the High Contracting Parties, the present
Pact [the future OAS Charter] shall cease to apply with respect to
such a state, remaining in effect with respect to all other High
Contracting Parties.”55 Then, on April 23, the Mexican delegate,
53. See President’s Letter of Transmittal of OAS Charter, supra note 51, at 97
(referencing the Argentine proposal that became Article 122 of the original
Charter).
54. See Proyecto de Pacto Constitutivo Del Sistema Interamericano: Informe
De La Comisión Sobre La Organización Del Sistema Interamericano [Draft Pact:
Report of the Commission on the Organization of the Inter-American System], in 3
ACTAS Y DOCUMENTOS 6, 6 n.1, 7-10 (1953) (submitted by the Pan American
Union); see also infra Section 2.A.2 (stating that it is reasonable to assume that
U.S. policy in conforming the draft Charter to the UN was a major influence in its
drafting especially because U.S. legal expert Charles Fenwick was the Director of
the Pan American Union’s Department of International Law).
55. Propuesta De Enmiendas Al Titulo, Al Preambulo Y A Los Capitulos I, VIII
Y IX Del Proyecto De Pacto Constitutivo [Proposal of Amendments to the Title,
Preamble and to Chapters I, VIII and IX of the Draft Constitutive Pact], in 3
ACTAS Y DOCUMENTOS 83, 86-87 (1953) (Argentine proposed draft article 88)
(translation by author; original Spanish: “Transcurrido un año a partir de la fecha
en que la Unión Panamericana reciba una notificación de denuncia de cualquiera
de las Altas Pares Contratantes, el presente Pacto cesara en sus efectos respecto a
dicho Estado, quedando subsistente para todas las demás Altas Partes
Contratantes”); see also Comision Primera, Segunda Sesion [First Commission

410

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[33:2

who had argued for a comprehensive regime linking all the proposed
instruments of the Inter-American system with the proposed new
constitutive instrument, resisted. He argued that silence on the
question, following the precedent of the UN Charter, would be best.
But, in the alternative, he judged that it would be necessary to follow
the precedent of the League of Nations and establish “certain
requirements” to permit withdrawal.56 Presumably, what he had in
mind was the third paragraph of Article 1 of the League Covenant,
which provides: “Any Member of the League may, after two years’
notice of its intention so to do, withdraw from the League, provided
that all its international obligations and all its obligations under this
Covenant shall have been fulfilled at the time of its withdrawal.”57
Some scholars have viewed the OAS language as comparable.58 It
may be that the linguistic difference with withdrawal from the
League being subject to it being “provided that all its international
obligations and all its obligations under this Covenant shall have
been fulfilled”; whereas under the OAS a state will “cease to belong
to the [OAS] after it has fulfilled its obligations arising from the
present Charter,” is a distinction without a difference.59 In one
respect, the Covenant’s requirement is more strenuous since it refers
also to international obligations in addition to those imposed by the
instrument.
Indeed, the difficulty of withdrawal under the
Covenant’s language promoted the U.S. Senate to insist on a
reservation to U.S. ratification of the League Covenant which would
have assured, had the treaty come into force for the U.S., that the
U.S. would have been the “sole judge” of whether or not it would
Second Session], in 3 ACTAS Y DOCUMENTOS 146, 163 (1953) (statements given by
Argentine representative regarding reasons for the proposed amendment).
56. See Minuta De La Tercera Sesion De La Subcomision C [Minutes of the
Third Session of Subcommittee C], in 3 ACTAS Y DOCUMENTOS 311, 312 (1953)
(“[a] la Delegación de México le parecía muy conveniente que se establecieran
ciertos requisitos para abandonar la organización, como estaba estipulado en la
Sociedad de las Naciones.”).
57. League of Nations Covenant art. 1. ¶ 3.
58. See Kunz, supra note 43, at 572 (asserting that the final formula, “after
having fulfilled the obligations arising from the present Charter,” is a “norm
clearly taken from the [League of Nations] Covenant”).
59. See, e.g., Josephine Joan Burns, Conditions of Withdrawal from the League
of Nations, 29 AM. J. INT’L L. 40, 40-49 (1935) (discussing the purpose of the
withdraw clause, its meaning, and who is authorized to determine its fulfillment).
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have complied with its obligations in the case of its own
withdrawal.60 On the other hand, the Covenant’s language makes
withdrawal subject to a proviso which presumably can be excused or
otherwise rendered inoperative; meanwhile, the language of the OAS
Charter makes effectiveness expressly conditional on compliance,
which arguably makes it even more restrictive than the Covenant’s
language.
Surely, the Mexican delegation was also aware that, while its
invocation by Japan, Germany, and Italy generated some debate, any
theoretical burdens the language may have imposed did not, in fact,
prevent the dissolution of the League. Presumably, therefore,
without regard to any similarities to the text of the League of Nations
Covenant, the Mexican representative could not have viewed the
clause as a way to prevent dissolution of the OAS, which the
comparable language in the League Covenant had failed to
accomplish. Rather, the Mexican delegate’s intentions become clear
in the next sentence of his submission in which he stated
“similarly . . . [he] thought it necessary to establish measures in the
case of a state that was violating the provisions of the Charter.”61 In
short, his focus was primarily on linking review of state compliance
60. See id. at 48 (explaining that by reciprocity the U.S. would have conceded
the same right to any other state seeking to withdraw from the League of Nations.
No similar “self-judging” reservation was included by the U.S. in its instrument of
ratification of the OAS Charter); see also infra section II.A.1 (discussing the
absence of any discussion of the OAS Charter withdrawal clause in U.S.
ratification history. It is possible that the U.S. has ceded that right with respect to
its own withdrawal from the OAS. If so, the U.S. could argue that the GOV’s
withdrawal is not self-judging. Logically, if the U.S. now argued that the GOV’s
withdrawal is not self-judging, given the absence of an express reservation by the
U.S., the U.S. would in turn be in a weak position to argue that the GOV’s
withdrawal is not self-judging. Under this line of reasoning, many of the questions
considered in this article disappear. However, predicating analysis on the
assumption that a treaty without express language providing for self-judging
withdrawal is self-judging would render surplus such language in other treaty
contexts); see also, e.g., infra section IV.A (discussing the NPT and how it would
be in conflict with international law’s central principles of pacta sunt servanda and
good faith); see generally Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note
15, at 339 (stating, under Article 26, that “[e]very treaty in force is binding upon
the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith”).
61. See Minutes of the Third Session of Subcommittee C, supra note 56, at 312
(“Asimismo, dijo que México creía necesario se estipularan medidas para el caso
de que un Estado estuviera violando las disposiciones de la Carta.”).
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at the stage of withdrawal with observance of all the substantive
obligations of OAS law rather than merely to prevent a state from
withdrawing per se. Under this view, the Mexican delegation
directed its efforts toward realizing the goal of an overarching system
integrating all the substantive rights and duties of OAS membership,
consistent with its original strategy of linking all the agreements of
the OAS system; in other words, the Mexican strategy privileged
depth and breadth of obligation over universality of adherence, even
if instrumentally it was prepared to constrain withdrawal. If so, the
President’s communication to the Senate obliquely hinted at the
Mexican delegation larger project of treaty-linkage in its reference to
the inclusion of substantive obligations in the OAS Charter.62
Argentina’s view, in contrast, was to privilege the sovereignty of
the withdrawing state. Replying to the Mexican delegation, the
Argentine representative emphasized the withdrawal clause’s basis in
the clausula rebus sic stantibus, which (when submitting the
proposed withdrawal clause) he had defined as the right of every
state to withdraw from a treaty because of a fundamental change in
the circumstances.63 The representative also made clear his view that
even the UN Charter could not deviate from this inherent right of
states, even if the Charter itself did not contain a withdrawal clause;
when initially submitting proposed Article 88, he had stated that the
UN Charter’s failure to include such a clause was a result only of the
need not to convey a message of “undue pessimism” and that the
right of withdrawal was recognized by the San Francisco Conference
drafting the UN Charter although he offered no details for the basis
for his description of that common understanding.64 Now, in his
response to the objections of the Mexican delegation, the Argentine
62. See President’s Letter of Transmittal of OAS Charter, supra note 51, at 97.
63. See Minutes of the Third Session of Subcommittee C, supra note 56, at 313.
64. First Commission Second Session, supra note 55, at 163 (Argentine
statement of reasons for proposed amendment; “[N]o se quiso dar un nota de
pesimismo y debilitar el organismo en el momento mismo en que se creaba—
aunque la Asamblea reconoció el derecho de todo Estado de retirarse.”); see also
Antonio F. Perez, On the Way to the Forum: The Reconstruction of Article 2(7)
and the Rise of Federalism Under the United Nations Charter, 31 TEX. INT’L L.J.
353, 448 (1996) (arguing that the record revealed a common understanding that the
Charter permitted withdrawal if it fundamentally failed to preserve international
peace and security).
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delegate explicitly stated it was through “informal conversations” in
the corridors of the conference that states decided they did not need
to make explicit what was deemed implicit.65 He added that the
Argentine proposal did ensure respect for “contractual” obligations
and would “impede denunciation” of the treaty, since the proposal
thus eschewed automatic withdrawal upon notice and, instead,
required that a state giving notice of withdrawal continue to respect
its obligations until the withdrawal had taken effect.66 He suggested
the Argentine proposal was “practically identical” to the Rio Treaty’s
withdrawal clause, although it should be noted that this formula, as
reported in the discussion, made express reference to the clausula
rebus sic stantibus as its rationale and, implicitly, as its criterion for
withdrawal.67 Finally, he asserted that Argentina’s insistence on a
right to withdraw was grounded on its own constitutional
requirements.68
While this particular debate was witnessed by delegates from only
five states, including the two protagonists,69 it cannot be doubted a
clear division of perspective emerged with the Argentine delegate
speaking primarily in terms of limited contractual obligations, the
fundamental rights of sovereign states, and constitutional supremacy,
and the Mexican delegate speaking primarily in terms of supranational constitutionalism and functional necessity. When the parties
returned to the issue two days later the current language of Article
65. Minutes of the Third Session of Subcommittee C, supra note 56, at 313
(“[S]e acordó por medio de conversaciones informales no fijar la consagración
expresa de la clausula de denuncia.”).
66. Id. (“[E]s precisamente de la impedir que el Estado denuncie el tratado por
el cual se ha ligado automáticamente y de establecer, al contrario, que durante un
tiempo determinado quede en la obligación de cumplir los compromisos
contraídos.”).
67. Id. (stating “La forma que presento ahora es prácticamente idéntica a la
discutida y aprobada en el Tratado de Asistencia Reciproca,” then quoting the Rio
Treaty as describing the right to withdraw as a recognition -- “reconociendo el
principio doctrinario” -- of rebus sic stantibus).
68. See id. at 314 (“[T]odo esto esta exigido por lo que es, en mi país, un
principio de derecho publico, reconocido y consagrado en nuestra Ley Suprema.”
[“Everything is required by what is, in my country, a principle of public law
recognized and enshrined in our Supreme Law.”]).
69. See id. at 311 (recording that delegates from Costa Rica, Uruguay,
Dominican Republic, Mexico, and Argentina were in attendance).
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143 was adopted with only stylistic differences.70 After, Argentina
reiterated its position that the clause was based upon the doctrine of
rebus sic stantibus, as understood in the Rio Treaty, but that a state
would be required to continue to perform its obligations during the
notice period.71
The Mexican delegate then proposed two
amendments, which were adopted. First, again referring to the
League of Nations Covenant, he suggested that a two-year period for
notice of withdrawal, “for a constitutive treaty, would appear to be
the minimum.”72 Second, purporting to draw on “customary clauses
of this kind found in international organizations,” he proposed the
formula,73 that when restated by the presiding officer as a separate
sentence, became what is now part of Article 143 – providing that
the withdrawal would take effect “after” the withdrawing state had
“fulfilled the obligations arising from the present Charter.”74
There was no discussion of the precedents relied upon. There was
no discussion of the difference between the original Argentine
proposal (which, as explained by Argentina, did not condition
withdrawal on performance of obligations but simply confirmed that
a withdrawing state remained bound until its withdrawal was
effective) and the Mexican language (which expressly conditions the
70. See Acta de la Cuarta Sesion de la Comision Primera [Minutes of the
Fourth Session of the First Committee], in 3 ACTAS Y DOCUMENTOS 205, 291-92
(1953).
71. See id. at 291-92 (“[C]onsagra una obligación: la de permanecer atado a las
obligaciones de la misma Carta durante un lapso que en el articulo esta fijado en un
año.” [It “consecrates one obligation: that of remaining bound by the obligations of
the Charter during the one year period the article specifies.”]).
72. Id. at 292 (“[Q]ue pongamos dos años (que es el plazo que ponía la
Sociedad de las Naciones) como plazo que realmente, tratándose de un Pacto
Constitutivo, parece el mínimo.” [“[T]hat we insert 2 years (which is the length put
by the League of Nations) as the length that really, in the context of a constitutive
agreement, appears to be the minimum.”]).
73. Id. (“Quisiera poner, también, otra cosa, que es costumbre en esta clase de
clausulas referentes a organismos internacionales. Agreguemos que el Estado que
denuncie el pacto se retirara después de haber cumplido con las obligaciones
pendientes dentro de la organización.” [“I would also like to propose another thing,
that is customary in these types of clauses in international organizations. It shall be
added that the State denouncing the pact shall withdraw after having complied with
its pending obligations within the organization.”]).
74. Id. (“El Estado que haga la denuncia quedara desligado de la Organización,
después de haber cumplido con las obligaciones emanadas de la presente Carta.”).
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effectiveness of withdrawal on the withdrawing state’s continued
performance of its obligations). Unlike the subgroup’s meeting of
April 23, attended by only a handful of parties, the more broadly
attended meeting of the Drafting Commission itself on Sunday, April
25, debated very little, if anything, of substance.
Yet the
amendments were accepted and the final language as amended was
ultimately adopted with only the immaterial stylistic change that the
last sentence became a final clause.75
Indeed, immediately after the adoption of Argentina’s proposed
withdrawal clause with the Mexican amendments, the Mexican
delegate made a further observation that may shed light on the
potential breadth of the amended language. He proposed an
additional article providing that, unless inconsistent with the Charter,
all other existing Inter-American treaties remain in force.76 The
effect of such a clause may have been to incorporate the full range of
treaties in the Charter, transforming them too into “obligations” that
could be deemed to “arise” from the Charter and therefore within the
scope of the withdrawal clause. This seems consistent with the
Mexican Delegations ultimately failed effort to incorporate all the
proposed treaties, including the Pact of Bogota and the Rio Treaty,
into the Charter system.77 Notwithstanding the failure of this effort,
the Mexican proposal does seem to suggest that, looking forward, it
was connected with the larger project of creating a system of interlocking obligations that would increase the price of withdrawal from
the Charter by burdening a state seeking to withdraw with a larger set
of obligations, much like a penalty clause or a tying arrangement.78
75. See Charter of the Organization of American States, supra note 13, at 2436
(“After two years from the date on which the General Secretariat receives a notice
of denunciation, the present Charter shall cease to be in force with respect to the
denouncing State, which shall cease to belong to the Organization after it has
fulfilled the obligations arising from the present Charter.”).
76. Comision Primera –Tercera y Cuarta Sesiones [First Commission – Third
and Fourth Sessions], in 3 ACTAS Y DOCUMENTOS 173 (1953).
77. See supra Section II.A.1 (discussing the effect of the Mexican Delegation
on the OAS charter).
78. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 (Am. Law Inst. 1981)
(explaining that damages for a breach by either party may be liquidated in the
agreement at an amount that is reasonable in the light of the loss caused by the
breach and the difficulties of proof of loss); Herbert Hovenkamp, FEDERAL
ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 534-76 (5th ed.
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Indeed, a later reference at the conference to the agreed language
construed it to include obligations “derived” from the Charter,79
perhaps looking forward to the continued evolution and
augmentation of the Charter as a system of law; much as, for those
looking backward, the Pan American Union had evolved through a
series of incremental reforms and initiatives.
Thus, on the surface, because of the Mexican amendment’s
potential breadth, the Argentine delegate’s acquiescence seems
inexplicable. Perhaps it reflected an artful compromise, as is so
often the case in negotiations, in which the parties found a verbal
formula in which both sides could simply agree to disagree? But,
perhaps, the better view, particularly in light of the Mexican
representative’s concern on April 23 that noncompliance not be
facilitated by withdrawal without consequence, is that the Mexican
amendment of April 25 was calculated to permit the OAS to take the
position that no state could fail to comply with its obligations and
then invoke the withdrawal clause to escape legal responsibility for
its noncompliance? In short, while the Mexican delegation’s original
goal may have been linkage across substantive obligations of the
OAS system, thus tying regional security to democracy and social
welfare, the consequence of its efforts may have been to constrain
withdrawal as a response to sanctions for noncompliance.
Yet, in the immediate aftermath of the Charter’s adoption it would
have been difficult, though not impossible, to argue that “obligations
arising” under the Charter clearly implied a correlative right for the
Organization to require a withdrawing state to re-establish
democracy before implementing its withdrawal. While it was clearly
a foundational principle of the OAS to “promote and consolidate
representative democracy,” this was “with due respect for the
principle of nonintervention.”80 Moreover, according to Charles
Fenwick, Director of the Pan American Union’s Department of
2016) (analyzing the anti-competitive, coercive effects of tying devices).
79. First Commission – Third and Fourth Sessions, supra note 76, at 173
(discussing that the Mexican amendment to the Argentine withdrawal clause by
making it clear that the clause is a necessary condition for withdrawal and that the
set of Charter obligations referenced is comprehensive including not only those
expressly stated, but also “derived” in some way from the Charter).
80. Charter of the Organization of American States, supra note 13, at 2395.
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International Law, at the Mexico City Conference of 1945 leading to
the Ninth International Conference at Bogota in 1948, the
Government of Guatemala proposed non-recognition of antidemocratic regimes, especially regimes resulting from a coup d’etat
against established democratic governments. When the proposal was
referred to the Inter-American Juridical Committee, according to
Fenwick, the Juridical Committee reported against the proposal
“chiefly on the ground of the vagueness of the term ‘antidemocratic.’”81 The OAS’s concept of democracy would have to
evolve to become more precise if it could ever be deemed an
“obligation” arising, or perhaps “derived,” from the Charter.

B. THE LAW OF OAS WITHDRAWAL – THE RISE OF DEMOCRACY
AS AN OBLIGATION ARISING FROM THE OAS CHARTER
The withdrawal clause’s meaning is almost certainly not limited
by the range of the text, context, object and purpose, and
supplementary means of interpretation as of 1948. Rather, the
Charter system subsequently evolved through amendments
(principally the Protocol of Washington); through the Democratic
Charter as arguably an authoritative interpretation of the amended
Charter; and perhaps also through larger contextual developments in
international law, especially the UN Security Council’s recognition
of the absence of democracy as a threat to international peace and
security. This expansive mode of interpretation is consistent with the
VCLT’s command that interpretation of treaty text must also “take
into account” subsequent agreements, subsequent practice, and any
relevant rules of international law.82
81. Fenwick, supra note 44, at 564 (stating that the Juridical Committee’s
report was never really considered by the Ninth International Conference, because
“a series of riots” in the city of Bogota turned the focus of the conference to the
adoption of a resolution addressing the disruptive effects on democracy of
international communism rather than the anti-coups issue, however, not simply
because of the interruption at the negotiation conference, substantive concerns
reflected in the report of the American delegation made clear that democracy
would not factor into recognition policy for purposes of the OAS Charter); see also
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, NINTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF AMERICAN STATES,
BOGOTA, COLOMBIA, MARCH 30 – MAY 2, 1948 82-84 (1948) (discussing a
resolution proposed to the Committee using references to “any form of
totalitarianism” and communism as anti-democratic regimes).
82. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 15, at 340.
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Any inquiry into the existence, scope, and content of obligations
relating to democracy under the OAS, however, must draw on the
historic tension between democracy and non-intervention, both of
which served as cardinal principles in the formation of the InterAmerican system.
The American States were, with limited
exception, founded as “republics” – truly things of the people rather
than possessions of monarchs. But they were also formed with a
heritage of anti-colonial sentiment that was only strengthened in the
period leading to the drafting of the OAS Charter in reaction to
European and U.S. intervention in the internal affairs of the Latin
American republics to promote paternalistic democracy or maintain
economic control, especially during the last third of the 19th century
and the first third of the 20th century.83 At the same time, prodemocratic intervention was an emerging, countervailing tendency in
the Americas. There is simply no other way to understand the
emergence of the Tobar Doctrine of non-recognition of governments
installed by golpes de estado and the Wilson Administration’s
parallel policy of non-recognition of revolutionary governments
taking power without reflecting democratic elections.84 It was not
surprising, therefore, that the Government of Guatemala effectively
sought to revive the Tobar Doctrine of non-recognition during the
Ninth International Conference negotiating the OAS Charter,
although its effort failed.85 But the seed was planted for further
developments in OAS law with potential implications for the law of
OAS withdrawal.86
83. See, e.g., GEORGE C. HERRING, FROM COLONY TO SUPERPOWER: U.S.
FOREIGN RELATIONS SINCE 1776 386-97 (2008) (discussing how the United States
asserted control over the republics “not to conquer them, but to help restore peace
and order” while also systematically eliminating German economic interests).
84. See generally LORI FISLER DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 293-94 (4th ed. 2001); H. LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 127-29 (AMS Press 1978) (discussing how the United States
followed the Tobar Doctrine by declining to recognize any other government that
came into power in the five Republics as a consequence of a revolution against the
recognized government as long as the freely elected representatives of the people
had not constitutionally reorganized the country).
85. See supra Section II.A.
86. See Antonio F. Pérez, Mechanisms for the Protection of Democracy in the
Inter-American System and the Competing Lockean and Aristotelian Constitutions,
in XXXIII CURSO DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 217, 219-27 (OAS Secretary-
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1. The Charter and Subsequent Agreements
The OAS Charter of 1948, as amended in 1967 and 1986,87
provides that democracy is a central value in the Inter-American
legal system. Article 2(b) of the Charter provides that it is the
“central purpose” of the OAS “to promote and consolidate
democracy, with due respect for the principle of nonintervention.”88
The Charter does not explain, however, what level of respect is due.
Article 3(d) further provides that all states party to the Charter
reaffirm the “principle” that “the solidarity of the American States
and the high aims which are sought through it require the political
organization of those states on the basis of the effective exercise of
representative democracy.”89
A purposive or teleological
interpretation of the Charter might then suggest that performance in
good faith would entail, as an impliedly necessary means, the
maintenance of domestic democracy.
Yet, Article 3(e)
simultaneously provides that “every State has the right to choose,
without external interference, its political, economic and social
system and to organize itself in the way best suited to it, and has the
duty to abstain from intervening in the affairs of another State.”90
Still, reading the two provisions together would suggest that the right
to choose a “political system” within the terms of the original OAS
Charter is not an absolute right but rather merely a right to choose a
particular form of democracy. That said, enforcement of that right is
left open and no state member of the OAS could assert the right to
intervene to enforce the duty of good faith performance in fulfilling
the purposes of the OAS by maintaining internal democracy.
General ed., 2006) (discussing the legal developments within the OAS system
concerning democracy).
87. Protocol of Amendment to the Charter of the Organization of American
States: Protocol of Cartagena De Indias art. 2(b), Feb. 26, 1986, O.A.S.T.S. No. 66
[hereinafter Protocol of Cartagena] (“Convinced that representative democracy is
an indispensable condition for the stability, peace and development of the
region.”); see generally ANDREW F. COOPER & THOMAS LEGLER, INTERVENTION
WITHOUT INTERVENING? THE OAS DEFENSE AND PROMOTION OF DEMOCRACY IN
THE AMERICAS 25 (2006) (discussing the role of Cartagena amendments in
initiating the process of enhanced protection of democracy in the OAS
community).
88. Charter of the Organization of American States, supra note 13, at 2395.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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In 1991, OAS Resolution 1080 purported to establish a procedural
mechanism for enforcement of the Charter’s obligations relating to
democracy. If a “sudden or irregular interruption of the democratic
institutional political process or of the legitimate exercise of power
by the democratically elected government” of a Member State
occurred – arguably a traditional “golpe de estado,” but perhaps
more – the OAS Secretary General would take the matter to the
political organs of the OAS which in turn would adopt such
measures as they deemed “appropriate.”91 Without specifically
providing for the sanction of suspension, the text seemed to open the
door to this possibility by including “an ad hoc meeting of the
Ministers of Foreign Affairs” among the relevant political organs
which might take such appropriate action.92 The significance of the
reference to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs is that the exclusion of
Cuba was the only precedent for suspension, and it was effected
through an Ad Hoc Meeting of the Foreign Ministers rather than
through the other political organs of the OAS.93 As such, legal
authority for suspension or exclusion of a state was not grounded
clearly on a violation of the pro-democracy provisions of the OAS
Charter. Rather, it appears to have been more connected to
complaints concerning Cuban support for subversive activities
contrary to the non-intervention principle and the OAS Charter and
Rio Treaty’s collective security commitments.94
Perhaps to clarify this uncertain legal situation, paragraph 3 of
Resolution 1080 initiated a process of further legal reform. This
91. Org. of Am. States [OAS], General Assembly Res. 1080 (XXI-O/91) (June
5, 1991).
92. Id. ¶¶ 1-2.
93. See General Secretariat of the Org. of Am. States, Eighth Meeting of
Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs Serving as Organ of Consultation in
Application of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, OAS Doc.
OEA/Ser.C./11.8, at 14 (Jan. 22-31, 1962) [hereinafter OAS Eighth Meeting of
Foreign Ministers] (stating that this incompatibility excludes the present
government of Cuba from participation in the inter-American system); Enrique
Lagos & Timothy D. Rudy, In Defense of Democracy, 35 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L.
REV. 283, 302 (2004) (discussing the Cuba precedent or how the Cuban
government was not excluded for its lack of democratic credentials per se).
94. See supra Part I (discussing how the decision to suspend Cuba was not
because Cuba had violated OAS norms with respect to democracy but rather that
Cuba had violated its collective security obligations under the OAS Charter).
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process resulted in the Protocol of Washington of 1992, entering into
force in 1997, which added Article 9 of the current Charter.95 That
provision established clearly, as a matter of positive OAS Charter
law, that a Member State’s privilege of membership could be
suspended by a two-thirds vote of the OAS General Assembly when
its “democratically elected government has been overthrown by
force.”96 The Ad Hoc Meeting of Foreign Ministers contemplated
under Resolution 1080, however, was not included in the Protocol of
Washington. This reflected the desire of some states, which had seen
the Cuba precedent as problematic, to distance the new mechanism
for suspension and exclusion from that precedent. Accordingly,
states that have not accepted the Protocol of Washington could argue
that, as a non-party to the new Article 9, they could not have their
privileges of membership suspended pursuant to this new
enforcement mechanism or, if the provision were construed to be
applicable only on the basis of reciprocity, they could not exercise
any right to seek the suspension of another member.97
Mexico was the only country that refused to sign and ratify the
Protocol and agreed to sever diplomatic relations with Cuba, and,
after Cuba’s suspension from OAS,98 issued a Declaration at the
time of its adoption articulating a principled objection. It stated:
Mexico is categorically opposed to any attempt to disrupt the
constitutional order in any country and further expresses a deep
commitment to democracy and the amelioration of our political
systems . . . [yet] it is unacceptable to give to regional organizations
supra-national powers and instruments for intervening in the internal

95. Protocol of Amendments to the Charter of the Organization of American
States, supra note 36, at 1005.
96. Id. (stating that suspension shall take effect immediately, the Organization
shall undertake additional initiatives to reestablish democracy in the member state,
the member shall continue to fulfill its obligations, and the suspension can be
revoked with the approval of two-thirds of the member states).
97. Cf. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 15, at 341 (“A
treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third State without its
consent.”).
98. See PERINA, supra note 20, at 39 (stating that some of the most important
Latin American countries, including Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico abstained or
opposed signing the Protocol).
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affairs of our states.99

However, while the Protocol of Washington only addresses the
case of when a “democratically constituted government has been
overthrown by force,” the Mexican declaration evidences an even
stronger commitment to democracy in that it expresses opposition to
“any attempt to disrupt the constitutional order in any country,” and
not merely those that are accompanied by “force.”100 Its objection
was not to the substantive duty of states, but rather to the remedy for
non-compliance. As already noted, however, Venezuela, having
accepted the Charter amendments relating to the protection of
democracy, is in no position to make this argument.101 In light of
Mexico’s strong public objections, moreover, it might be reasonable
to infer that other states have accepted the view that the Protocol of
Washington made new law.
Yet, the Protocol of Washington did not mark a radical departure
and, instead, merely elaborated existing provisions of substantive
character. Mexico’s objections arguably would have been equally
vociferous if the Protocol merely represented the codification of an
existing authoritative interpretation of the amended OAS Charter’s
substantive obligations in respect of democracy in the original
Charter, as amended by the 1986 Protocol of Cartagena.102 This
latter view is a plausible reading of the terms of U.S. ratification.
The Secretary of State’s “Letter of Submittal” of the treaty to the
President stated that the treaty would “upon entering into force . . .
provide for either suspension or the lifting of a suspension of a
Member of the Organization whose democratically constituted
government has been overthrown by force.”103 However, the
President’s “Letter of Transmittal” to the Senate said only that the
relevant provisions merely “incorporate a procedure” for suspension
when a state’s “democratically elected” government has been
99. General Information of the Treaty, supra note 37 (taking issue with the
punitive character of the proposal).
100. Protocol of Amendments to the Charter of the Organization of American
States, supra note 36, at 1005; General Information of the Treaty, supra note 37.
101. See supra Part II (stating that Venezuela has ratified all the relevant
amendments to the OAS Charter including Article 9).
102. See Protocol of Cartagena, supra note 87.
103. S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103-22, at 5 (1994).
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overthrown by force.”104 Finally, the Report of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee (SFRC) stated that the “amendment merely
formalizes procedures already in practice based upon a decision
taken by the OAS General Assembly in 1991 in the so-called
Santiago Declaration,”105 thus implying that the procedures were
already lawful under the OAS Charter without benefit of the
amendment. The SFRC Report also stated that, in protecting
democracy from forcible overthrow, it was “appropriate to suspend
any government or junta,” thus employing a disjunctive formula to
describe the alleged wrongdoer “which insists on violating that
principle” and thereby implying that the scope of the sanction
applied to forcible overthrows resulting, unlike the typical coup
d’etat or golpe de estado, in a government not formed by a military
junta.106 This too would suggest that the scope of the provision
extended beyond the specific circumstances governed by the
Santiago Declaration concerning military overthrow of governments
to any threat to democratic government contemplated by the OAS
Charter as previously amended by earlier protocols.
However, the Senate’s resolution of ratification of the Protocol of
Washington did not contain a federalism reservation107 unlike its
resolution of ratification for the original OAS Charter.108 That
reservation provided that “none of [the OAS Charter’s] provisions
shall be considered as enlarging the powers of the Federal
Government of the United States or limiting the powers of the
several States of the Federal Union with respect to any matters
recognized under the Constitution as being within the reserved
powers of the several States.”109 The significance of this reservation
is revealed in the colloquies before the then Committee on Foreign
Relations in its hearing on August 1, 1950,110 but it is also part of a
larger story of U.S. resistance to human rights treaties that would
104. Id. at 3.
105. S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103-28, at 1-2 (1994).
106. Id. at 2.
107. See 140 CONG. REC. 10484 (1994) (enacted).
108. See 96 CONG. REC. 13608 (1950).
109. Id.
110. See generally The Charter of the Organization of American States: Hearing
Before the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 81st Cong. 1-2 (1950) [hereinafter OAS
Charter Senate Hearing].
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shortly call into question U.S. domestic practices of disenfranchising
and otherwise subordinating African-Americans to Jim Crow laws in
the South and elsewhere.111 This so-called Bricker Amendment
controversy related to the possibility imagined by the Supreme Court
in Missouri v. Holland,112 often called the Migratory Birds Treaty
Case, that an Article II Treaty may enable Congress to enact
legislation that might reach beyond enumerated federal powers into
the reserved powers of the states.113
The proposed Bricker
Amendment to the Constitution would have eliminated that
possibility;114 and, in the meantime, the Senate initiated the practice
of conditioning its advice and consent to ratification on reservations
that would confirm that any treaty capable of being interpreted to
upset existing U.S. “racial relations” would not, as ratified by the
U.S. at least, have such domestic effects under U.S. law or place the
U.S. in breach of an international obligation.115
The question was whether the treaty was capable of such an
interpretation, a matter that troubled the Senators during the hearing.
The Chairman, Senator Connally, drew attention to Article 29 of the
111. See infra Part III (discussing the internal shift in the US “Democracy
Clause” from a largely political form of “soft law” when the OAS Charter was
adopted to a form of hard law).
112. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
113. Id. at 433 (“It is obvious that there may be matters of the sharpest exigency
for the national well being that an act of Congress could not deal with but that a
treaty followed by such an act could.”).
114. See 99 CONG. REC. 143, 160 (1953) (proposing an amendment to the US
constitution which would prevent an international treaty from controlling or
denying any of the constitutional rights of US citizens, and requiring an
international treaty to become effective US law only through congressional
enactment); Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The
Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 341, 348 (1995) (“Between 1950 and
1955 Senator Bricker of Ohio led a movement to amend the Constitution in ways
designed to make it impossible for the United States to adhere to human rights
treaties. The campaign for the Bricker Amendment apparently represented a move
by anti-civil-rights and “states’ rights” forces to seek to prevent--in particular-bringing an end to racial discrimination and segregation by international treaty.”).
115. Henkin, supra note 114, at 348-49 (“To help defeat the amendment, the
Eisenhower administration promised [in 1953] that the United States would not
accede to international human rights covenants or conventions.”); see generally id.
at 345-46 (discussing how US “federalism” clauses attached to the ratifications of
human rights conventions have no legal purpose but may instead be intended to
alert other parties of the United States’ intent in its implementation).
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proposed Charter, and to Article 45 of the current Charter,116 which
“caused some disturbance” because it included nondiscrimination
requirements relating to, among other things, race.117 Article 30,
current Article 46,118 was feared to be a possible wedge for the
federalization of the U.S. educational system.119 There were multiple
references to the dangers suggested by the so-called “Migratory
Birds” case.120 It was thought, therefore, that a reservation
preserving the constitutional allocation of authority between the
federation and the states would be necessary. But Senator Green’s
proposed reservation not only had a federalism component but also
provided that certain problematic provisions of the treaty would not
be self-executing, meaning they would not be enforceable as part of
U.S. law.121 Yet, Senator Lodge had earlier raised the fear of
unintended adverse international political consequences for the U.S.
from a possible reservation when he asked: “Has the State
Department considered the possibility of a reservation of this kind
being used by Communist propaganda in countries where there are
large numbers of colored people to show that the United Stars is not
sympathetic with the aims of colored people in general.”122 Thus, the
final version adopted as proposed by Senator Smith deleted
references to particular provisions so as not to draw attention to the

116. Charter of the Organization of American States, supra note 13, 2 U.S.T. at
2395 (“All human beings, without distinction as to race, sex, nationality, creed or
social condition, have a right to material well-being and to their spiritual
development, under circumstances of liberty, dignity, equality of opportunity, and
economic security.”); see OAS Charter Senate Hearing, supra note 110, at 19
(questioning whether Congressional advisors were with the American delegation
when Article 29 was drafted in Bogota and discussing the Committee’s specific
concerns about the implications of the term “worker dignity”).
117. OAS Charter Senate Hearing, supra note 110, at 18-19.
118. Charter of the Organization of American States, supra note 13, 2 U.S.T. at
2395 (“The Member States will exert the greatest efforts . . . to ensure the effective
exercise of the right to education.”).
119. See OAS Charter Senate Hearing, supra note 110, at 24-25 (discussing how
elementary education in the US cannot be guaranteed to be provided by the federal
government without cost under the treaty because constitutionally elementary
education is delegated to the states).
120. Id. at 13-15.
121. Id. at 40.
122. Id. at 8-9.
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substantive U.S. concerns.123 This seemed to have the virtue of
reducing the risk of creating the propaganda weapon that would have
troubled Senator Lodge but at the same time would have preserved
the status quo in the U.S. with respect to race relations, particularly
as to state-run schools.
While the original OAS Charter’s provisions that might have
stimulated effective democracy in the U.S. states were stillborn
under the terms of U.S. ratification, the ratification of the Protocol of
Washington occurred in an entirely different legal universe for the
U.S., domestically as well as internationally. U.S. ratification of the
Protocol of Washington did not require a federalism clause allowing
the U.S. to advance internationally within the corridors of OAS a
much more robust understanding of the substantive obligation
concerning democracy “arising from” the OAS Charter as amended.
In light of Mexico’s strong objections, this may well have been the
view that was shared by other OAS Member States and the
subsequent practice of the political organs of the OAS seem to
support this possible inference.
2. Subsequent Practice
Analysis of subsequent practice under the OAS Charter as
amended by the Protocol of Washington proceeds in two steps: First,
OAS practice giving rise to the Democratic Charter; second, OAS
practice under the Democratic Charter.
a. The Democratic Charter
With both the legal status of the Protocol of Washington for nonparties and the precise meaning of the triggering mechanism,
whether a true golpe or any “unconstitutional interruption” in doubt,
an effort was launched to cure these legal deficits through a new
source of law that might achieve unanimous consent. That source
was found in the new Democratic Charter, adopted by a special
General Assembly of the OAS on September 11, 2001.124 This
123. Id. at 43.
124. Inter-American Democratic Charter, supra note 2, at 1289 (creating a new
instrument with its central goal being the strengthening and protecting of
democratic institutions in the Americas).
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unanimously adopted resolution provides a more comprehensive
scheme for the protection and furtherance of democracy in the
hemisphere than the less detailed scheme in Resolution 1080 or the
Protocol of Washington. The Democratic Charter provides for three
distinct mechanisms. The first, under Article 17, provides for a
Member State’s request for OAS assistance in protecting its
democratic order.125 The second, under Article 18, provides a vehicle
for OAS’s initiative in providing such assistance with the consent of
the threatened state.126 There is nothing new here since these
provisions provide for nothing more than consensual activities that
cannot be construed to be in tension with the non-intervention
clauses of the OAS Charter.
Articles 19 to 22 of the Democratic Charter, however, do establish
a scheme that is in tension with the non-intervention principle
because they provide a roadmap leading to suspension, the ultimate
sanction. Article 19 defines the scope of these provisions as
covering two classes of cases in a member state: First, “an
unconstitutional interruption of the democratic order;” and, second,
“an unconstitutional alteration of the constitutional regime that
seriously impairs the democratic order.”127 While Article 19 is
merely declaratory of the scope and policy of the new mechanism, it
contemplates two cases of increasing severity. One case involves an
actual “unconstitutional interruption” of the “democratic order” of a
Member State; the other involves a lesser threat, “an unconstitutional
alternation of the constitutional regime” that merely “seriously
impairs” but does not “interrupt” that democratic order. Admittedly,
the language leaves open the question of whether a democratic order
can be interrupted without a violation or unconstitutional alteration
of the constitutional regime of the state.
That said, Article 20 provides that “an unconstitutional alteration
of the constitutional regime that seriously impairs the democratic
order in a member state” may yield the invocation of the procedures
contemplated in that provision.128 The third paragraph of the
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 1292.
Id. at 1293.
Id.
Id.
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provision increases the pressure on the target state when it provides
that a special session of the General Assembly “shall” be convened
by the Permanent Counsel and “will” take “decisions” when the
“diplomatic initiatives” undertaken pursuant to the second paragraph
of Article 20 “prove unsuccessful.”129 It should be clear that these
“decisions,” which address the case of unconstitutional conduct,
necessarily fall short of suspension and merely escalate the level of
pressure on the target state. The “suspension” sanction is reserved
under Article 21 only for when “the General Assembly determines
that there has been an unconstitutional interruption of the democratic
order of a member state” and “diplomatic initiatives have failed.”
But in such a case, Article 21 leaves no room for discretion
providing that the “General Assembly shall take the decision to
suspend,” albeit by a two-thirds vote.130 Of course, the General
Assembly could evade this responsibility by simply refusing to draw
the quasi-legal, quasi-political conclusion that there had been an
“unconstitutional interruption of the democratic order of a member
state.” The General Assembly could continue, instead, to operate
within the confines of Article 20, taking such other decisions and
imposing such other sanctions as it felt authorized to do under the
Charter131 particularly since Article 22 would require another supermajority vote, again by two-thirds, to terminate the suspension, thus
giving a mere plurality of states the power to continue to block lifting
a suspension even in the case of serious debate over whether “the
situation that led to suspension has been revolved.”132 In short, even
in the most unproblematic case, the terms of the Democratic Charter
yield a hornet’s nest of difficult legal questions.
Given the risk of interpretive overreach and, therefore, the
129. Id.
130. Inter-American Democratic Charter, supra note 2, at 1293.
131. See, e.g., David S. Berry, Non-Democratic Transitions: Reactions of the
OAS and Caricom to Aristide’s Departure, 33 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 249,
251-56 (2005) (criticizing the muted OAS response to Aristide’s departure and the
organization’s failure to suspend Haiti as required under Articles 20-21); see
generally Timothy D. Rudy, A Quick Look at the Inter-American Democratic
Charter of the OAS: What Is It and Is It “Legal”?, 33 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. &
COM. 237, 240 (2005) (describing the Democratic Charter as a political rather than
a legal document which functions as a non-binding resolution of soft law).
132. Inter-American Democratic Charter, supra note 2, at 1289.
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potential for a substantial conflict with the non-intervention norm,
the precise legal status of the Democratic Charter becomes a pressing
legal question. Not surprisingly, to confirm its legitimacy, the
Democratic Charter itself offers a theory about its own status as law.
To begin with, according to Article 19, it is “[b]ased on the
principles of the Charter of the OAS and subject to its norms, and in
accordance with the democracy clause contained in the Declaration
of Quebec City,” that “an unconstitutional interruption of the
democratic order or an unconstitutional alternation of the
constitutional regime that seriously impairs the democratic order in a
member state, constitutes, while it persists, an insurmountable
obstacle to the government’s participation” in the political organs of
the OAS.133 Preambular paragraph 18 also affirms that the Member
States recognize that “all the rights and obligations of member states
under the OAS Charter represent the foundation on which
democratic principles in the Hemisphere are built. . . .”134 In
Preambular paragraph 19, the Member States affirmed “the
progressive development of international law and the advisability of
clarifying the provision set forth in the OAS Charter and related
basic instruments on the preservation and defense of democratic
institutions, according to established practice. . . .”135 According to
Enrique Lagos, Legal Counsel to the OAS when the Democratic
Charter was adopted, this language taken together signifies the
intention of the Member States to rely on Article 31 of the provisions
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties relating to
subsequent agreements and subsequent practice under an
agreement.136 In short, the Preambular language offers a theory of
the origins for the Democratic Charter, its own creation myth.
The substance of these clauses appears to have been included at
the suggestion of the Inter-American Juridical Committee of the
OAS (IJC). The IJC focused on the question of whether Article 9 of
the Protocol of Washington could be interpreted beyond its letter
which appeared to address only the case of the classic military coup,
also, to cover the other cases contemplated by the draft Democratic
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Lagos & Rudy, supra note 93, at 304-05.
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Charter involving “any other rupture that violates basic constitutional
principles and is so grave and not easily rectifiable through domestic
measures as to prevent the government in question from being
considered democratically constituted.”137 The Juridical Committee
opined that “it would be unnecessary to amend the OAS Charter,
provided that the text of the Democratic Charter explicitly states that
it is setting forth an interpretation of the OAS Charter, and assuming,
of course, that the Democratic Charter is adopted by consensus.”138
Yet, notwithstanding the IJC’s suggestion, the precise language of
Article 19 and Preambular paragraphs 18 and 19 do not refer to
Article 9 of the Charter, as amended by the Protocol of Washington.
Rather, they refer simply to the “OAS Charter,” a term of ambiguous
meaning when some states had ratified Article 9 and others had not.
If the term “OAS Charter” were construed to refer to the only OAS
Charter that would have been common to the community of states
adhering unanimously to the Democratic Charter, then the object of
the reference would have been the Charter without the Protocol of
Washington. Under this view, the Democratic Charter would
constitute an authoritative interpretation of the power of suspension
under the original Charter, which had been exercised against Cuba
ostensibly on grounds that related to Cuba’s intervention in the
affairs of other Member States rather than its compliance with
democratic norms of governance.
But such a technical parsing of the precise language of the
Democratic Charter concerning its source of authority seems
inconsistent with international practice concerning the interpretation
of resolutions of this character. A former president of the InterAmerican Juridical Committee, Mauricio Herdocia Sacasa, took the
view that because of its unanimous adoption by the OAS General
Assembly and its origins as an initiative of Quebec Summit of the
Heads of State of the Americas, the Democratic Charter is more than
a mere recommendation of the OAS General Assembly. Rather, like
the Friendly Relations Declaration of the United Nations General
137. Observations and Comments of the Inter-Am. Jurid. Comm. on the Draft
Inter-Am. Democratic Charter, Ann. Rep. of the Inter-Am. Jurid. Comm. to the
Gen.
Assemb.,
¶
38,
OAS/Ser.Q/VI.32,
CJI/doc.76/01
(2001),
http://www.oas.org/en/sla/iajc/docs/INFOANUAL.CJI.2001.ING.pdf.
138. Id. ¶ 40.

2017]

DEMOCRACY CLAUSES IN THE AMERICAS

431

Assembly, it might be an authoritative interpretation of the
constitutive instrument of the organization.139 Such UN resolutions
have also been regarded as evidence of customary international law.
Accordingly, one leading scholar argued that the Democratic Charter
could reflect the articulation or codification of supervening regional
custom.140 Under these theories, as a matter of the special law of the
Inter-American system.
Either the theory of authoritative
interpretation, crystallizing possibilities that may have seemed only
latent in light of the early practice of the OAS, or supervening
regional custom, the Democratic Charter would then serve as
positive international law binding on all Member States of the OAS
(and perhaps even non-member states subject to an emerging
regional custom). Yet, these views have not received universal
assent, as others appear to take the view that the Democratic Charter
is merely a resolution of the General Assembly, which, albeit binding
on the organs of the OAS such as its Secretariat, serves merely as
recommendations to the member states themselves.141 In sum, the
precise legal status of the Democratic Charter is, and until there is a
new treaty instrument universally adopted by all OAS member states,
probably will remain a matter of dispute.
It is not surprising that, even though the Member States took such
care in establishing the legal basis for the enforcement mechanisms
of the Democratic Charter, there would remain considerable doubt as
to their legal nature and status. Articles 19-22 would appear to
expand the grounds for intervention made available under the
139. MAURICIO HERDOCIA SACASA, SOBERANÍA CLÁSICA, UN PRINCIPIO
DESAFIADO . . . ¿HASTA DÓNDE? (2005).
140. JOSÉ A. PASTOR RIDRUEJO, CURSO DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PÚBLICO
Y ORGANIZACIONES INTERNACIONALES (2001); see Asylum Case (Colombia v.
Peru), Judgment, 1950 I.C.J 266, 274, 276-77 (Nov. 20) (presenting a case where
Colombia based their submission partly on rules resulting from agreement and on
an alleged custom); see also Inter-Am. Jurid. Comm. Res. I-3/95, Democracy in
the Inter-American System (Mar. 23, 1995), Ann. Rep. of the Inter-Am. Jurid.
Comm. to the Gen. Assemb., CJI/ISO/doc.3/96 rev. 1, at 25-36 (1996),
http://www.oas.org/en/sla/iajc/docs/INFOANUAL.CJI.1995.ING.pdf
(asserting
that democracy is a binding norm in the Inter-American regional system).
141. See Jean-Michel Arrighi, L’Organisation des États Américains et le droit
International 355 RECUEIL DES COURS LECTURES 238 (2012); see also supra notes
24-26 and accompanying text (showing Arrighi’s initial comments on the
Venezuelan withdrawal from the OAS).
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Protocol of Washington. And, even assuming that these provisions
are in fact legally binding as authoritative interpretations of the OAS
Charter, it may still be true that their actual implementation is
entirely a “political question,” as has been suggested by the OAS
Secretariat’s Legal Counsel at the time the Democratic Charter was
adopted.142 The difficulty of identifying the precise meaning of the
Democratic Charter’s detailed terms might reveal why this should be
so, since any inquiry into whether an alteration of a state’s
constitution has occurred will inevitably raise enormously difficult
questions of constitutional law and constitutional fact requiring the
services of comparative constitutional law experts, as well as other
disciplines. Doubts about the dangers that would arise by setting sail
on this sea have caused at least one author to go so far as to suggest
that the very inquiry would require the OAS to purport to be the
authoritative interpreter not only of the OAS Charter but also of the
internal constitutional law of a member state, a proposition
fundamentally at war with support for democracy in the Member
States.143 Of course, such a broad view of the reach of the nonintervention norm, if taken to its logical extreme, would in turn
eviscerate the Democratic Charter.
That said, doubt about the legal status of the Democratic Charter,
factual uncertainties and risk of overreaching that attend the
application of any extremely complex legal norm to real life
situations, and the inevitably political character of implementation,
may argue for restrained interpretation of the Democratic Charter.
Subsequent practice seems to confirm this intuition.
b. Subsequent Practice Under the Democratic Charter
In general, subsequent practice under the Democratic Charter
suggests that the OAS and its Member States have adopted a
restrained interpretation of their powers and rights under Resolution
1080, the Protocol of Washington, and even the Democratic Charter.
The principal case applying Resolution 1080 of 1991 before the
142. See Lagos & Rudy, supra note 93, at 294.
143. See Stephen J. Schnably, The OAS and Constitutionalism: Lessons from
Recent West African Experience, 33 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 263, 265
(2005).
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adoption of the Democratic Charter was the so-called “auto-coup” of
Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori on April 5, 1992, in which the
President dissolved the legislature unconstitutionally, leading to
repeated OAS condemnation.144 In the years following and before
the adoption of the Democratic Charter, the OAS was presented with
a number of cases that it deemed to be within Resolution 1080’s the
scope: yet another “auto-coup” in Guatemala in 1993145; and a near
coup in Paraguay in the form of the near resignation of the President
in the face of the failure of the Chief of Staff of the military to resign
follow the President’s order that he do so.146 On the other hand, in
the face of an arguable congressional coup -- Ecuadorian President
Abdala Bucaram’s removal from office by deposed by the
Ecuadorian National Congress through what appeared to be
unconstitutional procedures, the Permanent Council Resolution did
not invoke Resolution 1080.147
Ironically, however, the first case to present itself after the
adoption of the Democratic Charter was Venezuela, when forces
resisting President Hugo Chavez temporarily removed him from
office with military support and the OAS Permanent Council adopted
a resolution condemning his overthrow. Chavez was immediately reinstalled, and there ultimately was no suspension of Venezuela.148 In
2005 Ecuador’s President Gutierrez removed the members of the
Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court and the Electoral Court.
After the army refused to obey the President’s order to suppress
demonstrators, the Congress, not following constitutional
procedures, removed the President, installing Alfredo Palacio as
President with the support of the Ecuadorean army. As in the earlier
Ecuadoran case involving President Bucaram under Resolution 1080,
144. See PERINA, supra note 20, at 69-71 (showing that after an emergency
meeting, the Permanent Council of the OAS invoked Resolution 1080, and urged
the Peruvian authorities to immediately facilitate the full functioning of democratic
institutions and to release the detained legislators, political leaders, and trade union
leaders).
145. Id. at 71-72.
146. Id. at 72-74 (articulating that the Argentine, Uruguayan, and Brazilian
Ambassadors on behalf of the MERCOSUR regional free trade organization and its
own Democracy Clause, strongly encouraging the President not to resign).
147. Id. at 74-75.
148. Id. at 99-100.
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neither the Permanent Assembly of the OAS nor the Government of
Ecuador at any point invoked the Democratic Charter.149 It was only
in the Honduran political crisis of 2009 that the Permanent Council
finally suspended a state from OAS membership under the
Democratic Charter. The circumstances are worth recounting.
In early June 2009 President Zelaya asked the OAS Secretary
General to send an electoral observer mission for a proposed
referendum scheduled for June 28 on whether or not to convene a
Constituent Assembly to amend the Honduran constitution to permit
Zelaya to run for re-election or extend his term of office. This effort
followed the precedent of the referendum already orchestrated in
Venezuela by President Hugo Chavez to eliminate presidential term
limits. The annual OAS General Conference meeting in San Pedro
Sula, Honduras on June 2-3, as it happened, provided a forum for
meetings between the Secretary General, the Honduran President,
and the President of the Honduran Supreme Court. But, as tensions
in Honduras mounted, on June 25, the Honduran representative at the
OAS Permanent Council requested the assistance of OAS, and the
Permanent Council. On June 26 the Permanent Council instructed
the Secretary General to send a mission to support President Zelaya,
although in the course of its deliberation the Permanent Council,
unlike the Secretary General, never consulted with the National
Assembly or Supreme Court of Honduras, perhaps dealing only with
the Executive Branch as the “government” of Honduras entitled to
request assistance under the Democratic Charter. Even though
President Zelaya decided not to proceed with the referendum on June
28, the Honduran military on June 29 removed President Zelaya
from office and put him on a plane to Costa Rica. The National
Congress then appointed its own President, Robert Micheletti, as
President of Honduras. Responding immediately on June 30, a
special session of the OAS General Assembly convened and
withdrew recognition of the Micheletti government and demanded
the restoration of the Zelaya government. When this demand was
ignored, on July 4 the General Assembly suspended Honduras from
OAS in accordance with the Democratic Charter and the Protocol of
Washington. Eventually, after free and fair elections in Honduras on
149. Id. at 93-94.
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November 29, 2009 and further assurances of the return of regular
democratic order, Honduras’s suspension was lifted on June 1,
2011.150 This, the first suspension of an OAS Member State since
Cuba’s suspension in the 1960’s,151 ironically occurring on the heels
of the OAS decision to lift Cuba’s suspension, subject to conditions
implying Cuba’s commitment to observe the “practices, purposes,
and principles of the OAS,”152 which presumably include its
commitment to democracy in an as-yet to be determined level of
compliance.
In the light of this subsequent practice, the organs of OAS,
including both the OAS Juridical Committee and the Secretary
General himself, have pointed to certain inadequacies in the
Democratic Charter. Secretary General Insulza by summer 2007 had
already expressed concerns about the lack of legal clarity concerning
the term “government” under the Democratic Charter.153 Based on
its authority as the OAS’s “advisory body on juridical matters” to
150. See PERINA, supra note 20, at 96-97, 101-03 (describing Venezuela’s
failed referendum in 2007 followed by a successful effort in 2009, removing the
constitutional ban against more than two terms).
151. See id. at 39.
152. See Org. Am. States, AG/Res. 2438 (XXXIX-O/09), Resolution on Cuba, ¶
2 (2009), http://www.oas.org/en/sla/docs/AG04688E08.pdf (providing that “the
participation of the Republic of Cuba in the OAS will be the result of a process of
dialogue initiated at the request of the Government of Cuba, and in accordance
with the practices, purposes, and principles of the OAS”); see also Mauricio
Vincent, Cuba rechaza entrar en la OEA después de 47 años, EL PAIS (June 3,
2009),
https://elpais.com/internacional/2009/06/04/actualidad/1244066404_850215.html
(showing that the Government of Cuba has yet to take up the OAS offer to return);
Franco Ordoñez, Is OAS move on Venezuela another effect of U.S.-Cuba détente?,
MIAMI HERALD (May 31, 2016), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nationworld/world/article81009017.html (demonstrating that the OAS’s approach toward
the application of the Democratic Charter in Venezuela could also have
implications for Cuba’s willingness to return to the OAS).
153. See OAS Secretary General, The Inter-American Democratic Charter:
Report of the Secretary General pursuant to resolutions AG/RES. 2154 (XXXVO/05) and AG/RES. 2251 (XXXVI-O/06), OEA/Ser.Q/VII.38, CP/doc.4184/07,
annex, at 102 (2007), http://www.oas.org/en/sla/iajc/docs/INFOANUAL.
CJI.2007.ING.pdf [hereinafter OAS Secretary General Report] (raising the
question to the Permanent Council whether the interpretation of the term
“government” should be resolved to strengthen the implementation of the
Democratic Charter).
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take up issues “on its own initiative,”154 the Juridical Committee then
adopted a resolution suggesting it would study the issue.155 While
the Committee did not ultimately advance an interpretation of the
meaning of “government” for purposes of the Democratic Charter, in
early 2009, before the Honduran case came to a crisis, a rapporteur
for the Inter-American Juridical Committee had already opined that
the Democratic Charter suffered from three main inadequacies: first,
it lacked “precise criteria” for determining when it applied; second, it
did not resolve the ongoing “tension” between the principle of nonintervention and the “possibility of protecting democracy through
collective mechanisms”; and, third, “access” to those “collective
mechanisms,” meaning the right of governmental organs, such as
legislatures or the judiciary, to request OAS assistance under the
Democratic Charter was not clearly available.156 The first and third
154. See Org. Am. States Charter arts. 99-100, opened for signature April 30,
1948, O.A.S.T.S. Nos. 1-C and 61 (entered into force Dec. 13, 1951) [hereinafter
OAS Charter], http://www.oas.org/en/sla/dil/docs/inter_american_treaties_A41_charter_OAS.pdf (authorizing that the Committee may undertake studies and
preparatory work as it considers advisable, and may suggest the holding of
specialized juridical conferences).
155. See Inter-Am. Jurid. Comm., Follow-up on the Application of the InterAm. Democratic Charter, ¶ 2, Ann. Rep. of the Inter-Am. Jurid. Comm. to the Gen.
Assemb.,
OEA/Ser/Q/VII.38,
CJI/RES.
132
(LXXI-O/07)
(2007),
http://www.oas.org/en/sla/iajc/docs/INFOANUAL.CJI.2007.ING.pdf (resolving to
“conduct an interpretation of the conditions and access routes to the applicability”
of the Charter); see also Eduardo Vio Grossi, Reasoned Vote, Follow-up on the
Application of the Inter-Am. Democratic Charter, Ann. Rep. of the Inter-Am.
Jurid. Comm. to the Gen. Assemb., OEA/Ser/Q/VII.38, CJI/doc.2740/07 rev. 2, at
88 (2007), http://www.oas.org/en/sla/iajc/docs/INFOANUAL.CJI.2007.ING.pdf
(allowing the Judicial Committee “to interpret the following terms and/or concepts
used in the text: a) Government”). But see Antonio Fidel Pérez, Explanation of
Dissenting Vote on the Follow-up on the Application of the Inter-Am. Democratic
Charter, Ann. Rep. of the Inter-Am. Jurid. Comm. to the Gen. Assemb.,
OEA/Ser/Q/VII.38, CJI/doc.284/07, at 88 (2007), http://www.oas.org/en/sla/iajc/
docs/INFOANUAL.CJI.2007.ING.pdf (rejecting the undertaking because, first, the
SYG’s report was directed towards the Permanent Council and, thus, the request
for a legal opinion had not been formally and explicitly requested by the Secretary
General or the Permanent Council, and, second, such a political and legal question
was better undertaken by the organs of the OAS that were competent to address
these questions).
156. See Jean-Paul Hubert, Follow-up on the Application of the Inter-Am.
Democratic Charter, Ann. Rep. of the Inter-Am. Jurid. Comm. to the Gen.
Assemb., OEA/Ser.Q/XIX.40, CJI/doc.317/09 corr. 1, at 46-7 (2009),
http://www.oas.org/en/sla/iajc/docs/INFOANUAL.CJI.2009.ENG.pdf; see also
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features have received considerable attention among critics of OAS
efforts under the Democratic Charter,157 particularly in the U.S.
Congress where financial support for OAS is tentative at best.158
The IJC rapporteur’s analysis, did not result in a substantive
resolution either at the IJC or at the political organs of OAS, does
merit consideration for pointing to some of the intractable elements
of the interpretive problem. The first feature, the lack of precise
criteria, is problematic even under the narrower definition of
Resolution 1080, as evidenced in the experience of the U.S.
executive branch since the early 1980’s in implementing the
condition in annual U.S. appropriations legislation requiring the
Executive Branch to terminate funding to a country when “a duly
elected head of government has been overthrown by military coup or
decree.”159 Indeed, even in the Honduran case, the U.S. never made a
formal public determination that President Zelaya had been
overthrown by a military coup; although, it did as a matter of policy
suspend aid that would have been barred had it made such a
determination.160 The second difficulty identified by the rapporteur
appears merely to re-state the question of the relation between two
competing rights and duties, non-intervention and democracy,
Inter-Am. Jurid. Comm., Follow-up on the Application of the Inter-Am.
Democratic Charter, Ann. Rep. of the Inter-Am. Jurid. Comm. to the Gen.
Assemb., OEA/Ser.Q/XIX.40, CJI/RES. 160 (LXXV-O/09), at 46 (2009),
http://www.oas.org/en/sla/iajc/docs/INFOANUAL.CJI.2009.ENG.pdf
(showing
that the report was, by resolution of the full IJC, forwarded to the Permanent
Council of the OAS for its information).
157. See, e.g., PERINA, supra note 20, at 86 (“It seems odd, if not undemocratic
and anachronistic, that the executive should be the only branch that can speak in
defense of democracy” and “there is no consensus among member states as to what
exactly is an ‘unconstitutional alternation,’ beyond the obvious military coup or
auto-coup.”).
158. See PETER J. MEYER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42639, ORGANIZATION OF
AMERICAN STATES: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS, 15-17 (2016).
159. See Note, Congressional Control of Foreign Assistance to Post-Coup
States, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2499, 2499-502 (2014) (providing extensive reports on
the implementation of these provisions); Kelley Powell, The History,
Constitutionality, and Applicability of the Military Coup Provision in
Appropriations Bills (April 2017) (independent research paper, Catholic University
of America, Columbus School of Law) (on file with author).
160. See PETER J. MEYER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41064, HONDURAN
POLITICAL CRISIS, JUNE 2009-JANUARY 2010, 13 (2010).
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without making an analytic advance. However, the third difficulty
concerning identifying the governmental entity entitled to receive
OAS assistance under the Democratic Charter merits much closer
consideration.
In the Honduran case, there was military
involvement, but the impetus to limit alleged executive branch
usurpation came from the National Assembly. In the Venezuelan
case, the applicability of the Democratic Charter also may turn on
whether the legislative body is entitled to international protection and
whether the cognizable threat to democracy can come from judicial
aggrandizement, albeit at the behind of the executive branch.161
These cases and the IJC report thus raise the question of whether
the Democratic Charter should be read in light of the broader
international developments and principles that gave rise to its
adoption, rather than a traditional international conception that only
organs of a government with constitutional authority to speak for a
government internationally can exercise those functions.162 Can
these broader developments in the international legal system serve as
a purposive gloss on the Democratic Charter, opening the door to
OAS efforts to act on behalf of domestic organs that do not have
ordinarily the capacity to request that assistance?
To address these kinds of foundational questions concerning the
international capacity of domestic organs and their possible
relationship to international organizations, it seems appropriate to
consult as “the relevant rules” of international law the larger
foundational principles that govern the law and practice of
international organizations. Moreover, in considering the meaning of
the Democratic Charter as an authoritative interpretation of the OAS
Charter, as amended, the relevant temporal context is the seminal
change in the international system that occurred in the last decade of
the last century and accompanied the adoption of the Protocol of
161. See Felter & Renwick, supra note 3 (describing recent developments in
Venezuela).
162. Cf. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 15, at 334
(identifying, in Article 7, the members of a “government” that are capable of
representing a state in its treaty-making capacity, none of which include members
of a legislative body or court); id. (describing, in Article 8, an act relating to the
conclusion of a treaty performed by a person not authorized is considered “without
legal effect”).
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Washington and the Democratic Charter.
3. Relevant Rules of International Law:
The Democratic Entitlement and Security Council Decisions
Supporting the View that All Assaults on Democracy Endanger
International Peace and Security
It is fair to say that the subsequent practice reveals restrained
interpretation, either because of the legal doubts described above or
merely in the exercise of political discretion (even in the case of
Venezuela). However, this restrained interpretation does not appear
to accord with the original ambitions of Resolution 1080, the
Santiago Declaration, the Protocol of Washington, and the
Democratic Charter. Rather, the context for these instruments would
argue for a much more robust understanding of the OAS rights and
duties with respect to the protection of democracy. Such a reading
doctrinally would unify earlier OAS practice suspending Cuba on the
ground of collective security and potentially suspending Venezuela
on the immediate ground of protecting democracy, turning on its
head President Maduro’s analogy in his letter of withdrawal to the
earlier OAS suspension of Cuba163; and, practically, it would serve
the larger objective of avoiding a threat to the peace the dissolution
of democracy in Venezuela might engender.
a. The Democratic Entitlement and Democratic Peace Theory
It might be argued that the OAS developments, namely ranging
from Resolution 1080, the Protocol of Washington, and the
Democratic Charter, must be viewed in a larger legal context; one
establishing a democratic entitlement of peoples, a correlative duty to
protect and advance democracy through robust implementation of
regional democracy clauses, and a keen appreciation of the
relationship between these rights and duties and the furthering of
international peace and security. The democratic entitlement thesis
emerged in the aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the
dissolution of the Soviet Union, both among leading international
lawyers164 and political scientists.165 At roughly the same time, so163. See Venezuela Letter Denouncing the OAS, supra note 17.
164. Compare Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic
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called democratic peace theory was advanced, drawing on traditional
Kantian claims,166 yet establishing a new “conventional wisdom” that
democratic governments do not go to war against each other.167 For
this and other reasons, the new Clinton Administration articulated as
its grand strategy so-called “Democratic Enlargement,”168 a set of
Governance, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 46, 46 (1992) (making largely empirical claim by
stating that “[i]ncreasingly, governments recognize that their legitimacy depends
on meeting a normative expectation of the community of states”), with W. Michael
Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law, 84
AM. J. INT’L L. 866, 867 (1990) (making a so-called Yale School of Public
International Law’s teleological approach by relying on Article 1 of the Charter’s
statement of “purpose” to develop friendly relations “based on respect for the
principles of equal rights and self-determination of peoples”). See generally Myres
S. McDougal & Florentino P. Feliciano, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC
ORDER: THE LEGAL REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL COERCION (1961) (assessing
whether decisions conform with an implicit calculus measuring conformity with
certain postulated values critical to world order).
165. See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992)
(generally arguing that the fall of the Berlin Wall and defeat of communism
signaled the endpoint of humanity’s political evolution, with Western liberal
democracy as the final form of human government); see also Francis Fukuyama,
The End of History?, 16 NAT’L INTEREST 3 (1989) (articulating Fukuyama’s first
publication of his ideas that were later implemented in his book, while he was
serving as Director of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff); see, e.g.,
SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF
WORD ORDER 31 (1996) (showing criticisms of Fukuyama’s work by his own
teacher when he received his doctorate in Government from Harvard’s doctorate,
who argued that continuing global cultural competition falsified Fukuyama’s
thesis); FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, OUR POSTHUMAN FUTURE: CONSEQUENCES OF THE
BIOTECHNOLOGY REVOLUTION (2002) (clarifying his original thesis by raising the
danger that humanity’s control of its own evolution may well undermine liberal
democracy); Francis Fukuyama, At the ‘End of History’ Still Stands Democracy,
WALL STREET J. (June 6, 2014), https://www.wsj.com/articles/at-the-end-ofhistory-still-stands-democracy-1402080661 (admitting that while liberal
democracy still had no real competition from more authoritarian systems of
government “in the realm of ideas,” nevertheless he was less idealistic than he had
been “during the heady days of 1989”).
166. See Michael W. Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part I,
12 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 205, 213 (1983) (drawing on Kantian theory that
democracies do not go to war against each other).
167. See Editors’ Note, 19 INT’L SECURITY 3 (Steven E. Miller et al. eds., 1994)
(proposing a new “conventional wisdom” but suggesting that too it would now be
critiqued).
168. See Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs,
From Containment to Enlargement, Address at the School of Advanced
International Studies, Johns Hopkins University (Sept. 21, 1993) in DEP’T ST.
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ideas that carried even into the foreign policy agenda of the Bush
administration in the decade that followed.169 In short, the common
assumption by the early 1990’s and the two decades that followed
was that democracy is intimately connected to the preservation of
peace, at least empirically. This perceived fact had implications for
the law of international organizations, such as the UN and OAS.
b. Security Council Determinations—Haiti
The requirements for peace were built into the DNA of OAS,
given its connection to the Rio Treaty170 and its status as a “regional
organization” Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.171 In fact, the U.S.
legal rationale for the blockading Cuba, described then as a
“quarantine,” to interdict further Soviet deliveries for nuclearDISPATCH,
1993,
http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/dispatch/1993/html/Dispatchv4no39.html
(describing the strategy of enlargement as including four features: (1) reinforce the
community of major market democracies, (2) nurture and consolidate new
democracies and market economies, (3) counter aggression by states hostile to
democracy and markets, and support their liberation when possible, and (4) pursue
a humanitarian agenda by encouraging democracy and market economies in
regions of humanitarian concern).
169. See George W. Bush, U.S. President, Second Inaugural Address (Jan. 20,
2005), in THE AVALON PROJECT AT YALE LAW SCHOOL, http://avalon.law.
yale.edu/21st_century/gbush2.asp (showing that the “Democratic Enlargement”
strategy was continually characterized in the goals of U.S. foreign policy); see
supra notes 107-23 and accompanying text (discussing the insertion of a
federalism reservation in the ratification of the initial OAS Charter); see infra notes
196-201 and accompanying text (discussing the realization of the Civil Rights
Amendments following the U.S. Civil War only in the period between the adoption
of the OAS Charter and the Protocol of Washington); see also William Safire,
Bush’s ‘Freedom Speech’, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/
2005/01/21/opinion/bushs-freedom-speech.html?mcubz=3 (asserting that President
Bush’s used his inauguration speech to expound his basic reason for the war and
his vision of America’s mission in the world and referenced the word “freedom”
forty-nine times).
170. See Sanders, supra note 48, at 382 (explaining how the organic pact of the
Inter-American System was designed to improve and strengthen the system and to
bring into formal relationship the disparate bodies that previously existed).
171. See Charter of the Organization of American States, supra note 13, 2
U.S.T. at 2396 (declaring the Organization of American States, within the United
States, as a “regional agency” in order to put into practice the principles on which
it is founded and to full its regional obligations under the Charter of the United
States).
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weapons-capable missiles, was based on authorization granted by a
decision of the OAS Permanent Council meeting as the “Provisional
Organ of Consultation” under the Rio Treaty.172 These measures
were unrelated, at least in law, to the question of democracy in Cuba.
Given the Cold War struggle between democratic capitalism and
communism, it would have been implausible to assert that Cuba’s
internal governance could serve as the ground for an OAS
authorization of a blockade or of Cuba’s suspension from OAS. But
beginning in the 1990’s, the Security Council began to examine
issues previously thought to be within the “domestic jurisdiction” of
states, which the organization had been bound to respect.173 It even
went so far as to enable it to make factual determinations concerning
the implications of threats to democracy for its authority to act under
Chapter VII of the UN Charter in the face of threats to the peace. As
a “regional” organization of the UN under Chapter VIII of the UN
Charter, OAS could not be indifferent to this development in UN law
and practice.
The case of Haiti demonstrates the factual and legal consequences
for OAS and its Member States and the Security Council’s increasing
appreciation of the connection between democracy and peace.
Almost contemporaneously with the Santiago Declaration and the
adoption and ratification of the Protocol of Washington, in
Resolution 940 (1994) the Security Council for the first time drew
the conclusion that the overthrow of a democratically-elected
government could serve as a basis for a Security Council
determination of the “threat to the peace,” as was required under
Chapter VII for its decision to authorize military force to reverse the
coup that had overthrown the democratically elected government of
Jean-Bertrand Aristide.174 Indeed, the UN was acting here to support
a regional consensus reflected in an OAS-approved regional embargo
on trade with Haiti, which, even after earlier U.N.-imposed
172. See Marjorie Whiteman, The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, in DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 523-24 (1965).
173. See U.N. Charter, supra note 42, art. 2(7) (“Nothing contained in the
present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which
are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.”).
174. See S.C. Res. 940, U.N. Doc S/RES/940, ¶ 4 (July 31, 1994) (authorizing
collective action to depose de facto authorities in Haiti).
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sanctions,175 had not been able to force the military government to
return power to civilian authorities.176 Admittedly, the Security
Council’s determination that the situation in Haiti was a “threat to
the peace” under Chapter VII turned also on an empirical finding that
the democratic rupture was accompanied by “the incidence of
humanitarian crises, including mass displacements of population,
becoming or aggravating threats to international peace and
security.”177 Yet, the Security Council’s assertion of authority to act
based on its appreciation of the particular facts of the situation turned
necessarily on the theory that the rupture of democracy could,
directly (through the external behavior of non-democratic
governments under the Democratic Peace hypothesis) or indirectly
(through the disorder, including refugees flows, that can result from
democratic rupture), constitute a threat to international peace and
175. See S.C. Res. 841, U.N. Doc. S/RES/841, at 2, ¶ 4 (June 16, 1993)
[hereinafter S.C. Res. 841] (“Recalling . . . the provisions of Chapter VIII . . . and
stressing the need for effective cooperation between regional organizations and the
United Nations.”); see also Rep. of the S.C., at 17, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3238 (1993)
[hereinafter Rep. of the S.C.] (highlighting the statement of Brazilian
representative Ambassador Sardenberg, including as a crucial factor that made the
Haiti Chapter VII determination unique that “action ha[d] already been taken in the
same direction by the OAS and by the General Assembly [and] [t]hat prior action
provides a framework which warrants the extraordinary consideration of the matter
by the Security Council and the equally extraordinary application of measures
provide for in Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter”).
176. See Rep. of the S.C., supra note 175, at 7 (including the statement of
Canadian representative Ambassador Frechette that “the OAS found it necessary to
seek the support of the United Nations”); Rep. of the S.C., supra note 175, at 17
(restating Brazilian representative Ambassador Sardenberg who described “the
request by the legitimate Government of Haiti that the Security Council make
universal and mandatory” sanctions since OAS sanctions were only
“recommended”); see also Charter of the Organization of American States, supra
note 13, art. 72 (“The Councils may, within the limits of the Charter and other
interAmerican instruments, make recommendations on matters within their
authority.”).
177. S.C. Res. 841, supra note 175, ¶ 9 (recalling the February 26, 1993
statement, in which the Council expressed concern over the “the incidence of
humanitarian crises, including mass displacements of population, becoming or
aggravating threats to international peace and security”); see generally Peru Calls
for Regional Action to Avoid Venezuela ‘Sea of Blood’, REUTERS, June 12, 2017,
http://ca.reuters.com/article/topNews/idCAKBN1932FJ-OCATP [hereinafter Sea
of Blood] (arguing that Latin America must take action to aid Venezuela in
resolving its political crisis or risk the country turning into a “sea of blood”).
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security with the meaning of Chapter VII.178 Given the close
cooperation of the UN and OAS in coordinated economic sanctions
regimes, ultimately leading a Security Council authorization to use
force to restore democracy in Haiti, it seems plausible to argue that
OAS legal competence as an organization includes the authority to
take coercive measures, such as the suspension provisions of the
Democratic Charter, to protect democracy in an OAS Member State.
In sum, the Protocol of Washington of 1992, and the Democratic
Charter which arguably authoritatively interprets it, were adopted
precisely at the confluence of several waves of ideas – the
democratic entitlement as a human right; the empirically and
normatively-based belief that democracies do not go to war against
each other; and the international community’s willingness, through a
united Security Council, to authorize forcible intervention to protect
democracy in a UN member state (when the Council judged that the
threat to democracy directly or indirectly would also entail a threat to
international security).
This confluence of ideas arguably serves as the set of fundamental
assumptions for interpreting the meaning of the Protocol of
Washington and the subsequent practice of the OAS and its Member
States under the Protocol. In this context, it would seem reasonable
to argue that the “legal” inadequacies identified by the Secretary
General and the Inter-American Juridical Committee are better
understood as political reasons for restrained application rather than
restrained interpretation. If so, the Democratic Charter could be
construed to address challenges to non-executive organs of
government and to all forms of creeping authoritarianism. Together,
the OAS Charter, its resolutions including the Democratic Charter,
and OAS and member state practice under them could comprise an
OAS Democracy Clause, forming an “obligation arising from” the
Charter. However, that this strong version of an OAS Democracy
Clause is a permissible interpretation does not render it a necessary,
or even a necessarily desirable, interpretation of current law in the
light of the full legal context and particular factual circumstances in
which it might be applied.

178. See U.N. Charter, supra note 42, art. 39.
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C. SYNTHESIZING THE OAS DEMOCRACY CLAUSE AND THE OAS
WITHDRAWAL CLAUSE – DISCRETION IN INTERPRETATION
To review, because of the particular wording of the OAS
withdrawal clause, the meaning of the OAS Democracy Clause is a
threshold question in determining the range of permissible
interpretations of the OAS withdrawal clause. This is especially the
case if the withdrawal, as appears to be the case in GOV’s attempt to
withdraw, is triggered by the withdrawing state’s arguable failure to
comply with the OAS Democracy Clause. It is useful to consider the
two extreme possibilities for synthesizing the OAS rules governing
state withdrawal with OAS law concerning democracy.
In general, a narrow view of the OAS Democracy Clause would
give priority to the original text of the OAS Charter as the only
universally binding conventional norm in the Western Hemisphere.
Even in treating the Democratic Charter as an authoritative
interpretation of the Protocol of Washington, broadening the scope of
Article 9 to those states to which it is applicable, one would still need
to take into account the restrained interpretation OAS has given to
both the Protocol and the Democratic Charter, limiting it to the
classic case of military coups overthrowing elected heads of
government. Meanwhile, a broader conception of the Democracy
Clause could rely on the context in which the Protocol of
Washington and Democratic Charter were negotiated. It would look
to the acquiescence in this emerging norm expressly or impliedly
manifested by all OAS member states through the unanimous
adoption of Democratic Charter at the OAS General Assembly. It
might even construe the language of the Democratic Charter to
address all cases of unconstitutional threats to democratic order of a
Member State. Finally, it would treat any contrary subsequent
practice and restraint in the imposition of sanctions merely as
evidence of politically motivated caution.
In the case of Venezuela, a narrow reading of the obligations
“arising” from the OAS Charter might therefore exclude any
obligations or sanctions imposed by the OAS pursuant to the
Democratic Charter, if the case is not deemed to fall within the
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technical ambit of a classic golpe de estado.179 Moreover, it would
exercise restraint in asserting any claims under the Democratic
Charter based on new facts that will arise during the remaining
period of the GOV’s membership, when dues are fully paid and the
required two-year notice period expires. Meanwhile, a broad reading
of the “arising” requirement might be deemed to include those
obligations or sanctions imposed by the OAS under the Democratic
Charter against Venezuela if it is deemed to fall within the larger
ambit of an unconstitutional “interruption” or “alteration” of the
Venezuelan regime. Moreover, the GOV would continue to be
bound under this broader view during the period of withdrawal and
would continue to have its rights of participation in the OAS policed
by the OAS pursuant to the Democratic Charter with respect even to
facts that arise during the period of withdrawal.
If, then, the OAS as an organization and its Member States have
legal-policy discretion in developing a position on the synthesis of its
law of democracy and law of withdrawal, two questions arise. First,
if the question of the best interpretation is informed by the best
current understanding of the OAS legal system’s capacities for
protecting democracy, it should be important to consider the range of
options for a legally effective Democracy Clause, in light of the
varying institutional capacities and contexts that have given rise to
varying degrees of legal obligation. In short, a general consideration
of the range of Democracy Clauses is a preliminary question to legalpolicy choice situating the OAS system within that range. Second, if
the question of the best interpretation must be informed by policybased criteria concerning the efficacy of varying interpretations of
the withdrawal clause in actually serving the goal of promoting
democracy, both now and in the future, the best interpretation ought
to take into account recent advances in the study of treaty
compliance, most notably in the scholarship developed under rational
choice theory. These two questions are considered in turn in Parts III
and IV.

179. See OAS Res. 1080, supra note 91.
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THE LEGAL NATURE OF DEMOCRACY
CLAUSES

Viewing democratization in the context of the OAS as a species of
legal obligations does not do justice to the full range of
considerations and preconditions for democracy, some of which may
well be eroding in recent years.180 The focus here is on the theory
identifying criteria for determining whether, and the extent to which,
democracy has become a “legal” norm. Law and political science
scholarship in the last generation have developed a language to
describe the ongoing process of democracy’s “legalization.” With an
understanding of the component parts of this legalization, it becomes
possible to consider the potential range of options in interpreting the
OAS Democracy Clause. A case study of the shifting internal U.S.
“Democracy Clause” from a largely political device at the time of the
adoption of the Charter of 1948 to a highly legalized norm when the
Protocol and Democratic Charter were adopted may provide useful
potential boundary points in the interpretation of the OAS
Democracy Clause. The U.S. case study also confirms that the OAS
Democracy Clause moved during that period from its origins in
“soft” law to some version of “harder” law, even if it does not reveal
the precise extent of that shift.

A. THE LEGALIZATION OF DEMOCRACY – OBLIGATORY, PRECISE
AND ENFORCEABLE
Much as international lawyers seem to have rediscovered political
science and other disciplines,181 political scientists of the last
generation have rediscovered law.182 In exploring “variation” in the
180. See, e.g., Larry Diamond, Facing Up to the Democratic Recession, 26 J.
DEMOCRACY 141, 144 (2015).
181. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Andrews S. Tulumello & Stepan Wood,
International Law and International Relations Theory: A New Generation of
Interdisciplinary Scholarship, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 367, 367 (1998) (explaining how
international lawyers seem to be rediscovering political science and other
disciplines); see also INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE STATE OF THE ART (Jeffrey L. Dunoff &
Mark A. Pollack eds., 2013) (providing thematic and substantive issue-area
exemplars of inter-disciplinary analysis of international law).
182. See Judith Goldstein et al., Introduction: Legalization and World Politics,
54 INT’L ORG. 385 (2000) (noting how the last generation of political scientists
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“use and consequences of law in international politics,” and defining
law as “a particular form of institutionalization,”183 international
relations scholars have developed formal criteria: “the degree to
which rules are obligatory, the precision of those rules, and the
delegation of some functions of interpretation, monitoring, and
implementation of a third party.”184 These criteria receive parallel
attention from international lawyers when they assess whether or not
a norm is deemed “legally-binding,” rather than a merely political
commitment185; whether the norm is sufficiently “determinate” to be
enforced186; and whether or not the norm is actually subject to
“compliance” through collective review and enforcement
mechanisms, such as courts and other third parties.187 In sum, the
legalization of democracy as a domestic condition required by
international law can thus be viewed through the three prisms of
legalization, tools that from a political science standpoint can cut
across domestic and international analysis.
There is some convergence, moreover, between international
lawyers and political scientists in viewing democracy as a set of
institutions performing a set of functions that cut across the nationalinternational (isn’t national-international divide oxymoronic) AFP: I
have chosen not to make comments except in response to comments.
have rediscovered law).
183. Id. at 386.
184. Id. at 387.
185. See Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, 77
AM. J. INT’L L. 413, 414-15 (1983) (meditating on the so-called “hard law” and
“soft law” divide in international law and calling for restraint in the development
of low-quality “soft law” that might undercut the efficacy of international law in
performing its functions).
186. See THOMAS FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 74-75
(1990) (distinguishing between so-called “Sophist” norms, which entail such
complexity that there determinacy is questionable in many applications and socalled “[i]diot” norms, which are so apparently simple that their application is
suspect without further norm-elaboration through interpretation or precedent).
187. See, e.g., Karen J. Alter, Lawrence R. Helfer & Jacqueline McAllister, A
New International Human Rights Court for West Africa: The Ecowas Community
Court of Justice, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 737, 737-38 (2013) (describing the
effectiveness of one regional human rights organization). But see Ingrid Wuerth,
International Law in the Post-Human Rights Era, 96 TEX. L. REV. 6 (forthcoming
2017) (observing that “widespread violations of some international law rules likely
make it more difficulty to enforce others”).
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I generally don’t trouble myself with happy-t0-glad editorial
changes. But really? The idiom used in the text is rather
conventional. It hardly seems appropriate to call it oxymoronic,
thereby insinuating the usage is moronic. divide. This idea is
potentially important as one considers the continuum of levels of
integration from state, to federation, to a free trade area, or a
confederation of states. Thus, international relations scholars tend to
focus on democracy’s benefits in the effects of democracy at one
level to cooperation at other levels; for example, in facilitating
international cooperation by democratic regimes through
international organizations,188 and in the role of international
organizations in supporting domestic democratic development.189
That said, rather than focusing on causality and variation,
international law scholars continue to identify “democracy,” in
normative terms, as the fundamental basis for legitimacy, both
domestically and internationally.190
Given the potential for bi-directional flows of international and
domestic effects, the very issue raised by the OAS Democracy
Clause, it might be useful to focus on extreme cases that can
illustrate these bi-directional flows. And given the critical role the
U.S. played in both efforts at international legalization, U.S.
democratic development can offer two important cases that can show
this potential range for these bi-directional flows. At one end of the
spectrum, the U.S. internal democracy clause at the time the U.S.
adhered to the original OAS Charter. At the other, the revised
internal U.S. democracy clause when the U.S. adhered to the
Protocol of Washington and Democratic Charter. Briefly stated, it
188. See, e.g., Edward D. Mansfield, Helen V. Milner & B. Peter Rosendorff,
Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade
Agreements, 56 INT’L ORG. 477 (2002).
189. See, e.g., John C. Pevehouse, Democracy from the Outside-In?
International Organization and Democratization, 57 INT’L ORG. 515 (2002).
190. See Daniel Bodansky, Legitimacy in International Law and International
Relations, in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE STATE OF THE ART 330 (2013). But see Jean
d’Aspremont, 1989-2010, The Rise and Fall of Democratic Governance in
International Law, in SELECT PROCEEDINGS OF THE EUROPEAN SOCIETY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 549-50 (J. Crawford ed., 2011) (noting weakening of the
position that international law requires states to be democratic).
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can be argued that limitations on the U.S. commitment to democracy
at the time of the founding of OAS precluded a strong OAS
commitment to democracy and in turn limited the influence OAS
could have in promoting democracy in its Member States, including
the U.S. As already noted, resistance to racial equality in U.S.
domestic law motivated the federalism reservation to the initial U.S.
ratification of OAS Charter, whereas U.S. democracy promotion
efforts in the 1990s were facilitated by the domestic transformation
of U.S. democracy, leaving the U.S. less susceptible to the charge of
hypocrisy. Arguably, therefore, the more robust U.S. commitment to
democracy a half-century after the creation of the OAS enabled the
U.S. to promote a stronger commitment to democracy in OAS, which
thereby enabled OAS itself to become more strongly committed to
democracy within its Member States.
Observing these changing relationships between domestic law and
international law does not establish causality, of course. Yet, at a
minimum, the two different U.S. domestic conceptions of
democracy, as well as the two different U.S. approaches to
international democracy promotion and its legalization in OAS,
evidence correlations that provide a paired set of alternatives for
OAS. More importantly, however, recognition of the significance of
the social, economic and political changes in the U.S. that were
required for this transformation should serve as a cautionary
reminder of difficulty involved in the legalization of a strong
commitment to democracy.

B. TWO U.S. DEMOCRACY CLAUSES —FROM “SOFT” TO
“HARD” DEMOCRACY LAW
In effect, two different sets of constitutional provisions have
served as the Democracy Clauses of the U.S. Constitution. First the
Guarantee Clause, under which the federal government “guaranteed”
the “republican” character of the states,191 was interpreted in a way so
as not to compel the federal government to intervene in southern
191. See U.S. CONST. art. 4, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every
state in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of
them against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive
(when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.”).
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states to terminate slavery. Later, the Equal Protection Clause of the
14th amendment served as the primary vehicle for the protection
democracy in the states.
1. Soft Semi-International Law
The pre-Civil War U.S. Constitution was as much akin to a treaty
organization as it was to a nation-state.192 The Guarantee Clause,
from that perspective, was more like a Democracy Clause in an
international or regional organization. In Luther v. Borden193, which
was superficially a simple trespass case, rebels against the lawful
government of the State of Rhode Island claimed that because the
defendant government was unlawful, its imprisonment of the
plaintiffs for insurrection was unlawful as well. Yet the Supreme
Court determined that the Guarantee Clause was a political question
committed to the political branches of the federal government for its
enforcement, rather than a matter fit for judicial determination.194
Luther reflected precisely the conception of state sovereignty that
accorded with the rights of states under international law against
intervention by a supra-national authority.195
Thus, if the Supreme Court could not determine whether a state
government satisfied the requirements of the Guarantee Clause for
192. See, e.g., DAVID HENDRICKSON, PEACE PACT: THE LOST WORLD OF THE
AMERICAN FOUNDING 266 (2003).
193. See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 1 (1948) (addressing the issue of whether
the Court had the constitutional authority to declare which dissident group,
protesting Rhode Island operating under an archaic system of government
established by a 1663 royal charter, and the old charter group—constituted the
official government of Rhode Island).
194. See id. at 1-2 (holding that “the power of determining that a state
government has not been lawfully established” did not belong to federal courts,
and that the creation of republican forms of government and the control of
domestic violence were essentially political matters that the Constitution commits
to other branches of government).
195. See id. at 47 (1948) (writing for the Court, Chief Justice Taney stated, “No
one, we believe, has ever doubted the proposition, that, according to the
institutions of this country, the sovereignty in every State resides in the people of
the State, and that they may alter and change their form of government at their own
pleasure. But whether they have changed it or not, by abolishing an old
government, and establishing a new one in its place, is a question to be settled by
the political power. And when that power has decided, the courts are bound to take
notice of its decision, and to follow it.”).

452

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[33:2

the narrow purposes of deciding a trespass case, it certainly could not
look into the nature of the state’s system of representation or the
quality of its protection for political parties. A fortiori, the Supreme
Court certainly could not look into the nature of the state’s political
economy for the purpose of determining how substantive dimensions
of democracy, such as the slavery question, were being addressed.
The political organs of the Federal Government never judged the
credentials or the southern states to be invalid or otherwise
suspended their participation in the Federal Government.
Of course, it took a Civil War and amendments to the Constitution
to make the fundamental breakthrough in political economy required
for the end of slavery in the United States.196 Yet the promise of
those amendments was never realized, as the political control
exercised by the slave-holding class in the American South, for
nearly a century, was reconstituted through a sharecropping system,
including debt peonage and other instruments,197 while educational
access was denied through the separate-but-equal doctrine,198 and
voting rights were compromised through disqualifying
requirements.199 Thus, a century later, at the time of the adoption of
the OAS Charter, post-Civil War Reconstruction’s failure resulted in
a legacy of repression for African Americans through limits on
voting rights and inferior education in segregated schools.200 It is not
surprising that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee insisted on
an elliptical federalism clause to disguise its fear that the OAS
Charter’s commitment to democracy and equality might de-stabilize
196. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (abolishing slavery); see also U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV (guaranteeing due process and equal protection rights to all legal
persons); U.S. CONST. amend. XV (conditionally assuring voting rights to all
persons).
197. See generally ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED
REVOLUTION, 1863-1877 (1988) [hereinafter FONER, AMERICA’S UNFINISHED
REVOLUTION].
198. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 548-49 (1896) (announcing the
“separate but equal” doctrine, later applied to schools, in the context of separate
accommodations for railroad passengers).
199. See, e.g., Breedlove v. Shuttles, 302 U.S. 277, 281-82 (1937) (rejecting an
Equal Protection Clause challenge to a Georgia poll tax).
200. See FONER, AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, supra note 197, at 575612 (detailing the end of Reconstruction and its effects for African-American
economic, educational and political participation).
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the anti-democratic status quo in the U.S. states.201
2. Hard Domestic Constitutional Law
A century later after Luther v. Borden, African-Americans
continued to be denied the effective exercise of their right to vote
when state and federal legislative districts were designed in ways that
were not equi-populous or otherwise shaped in ways that had the
effect of diluting the voting power of African-American
constituencies. Though bound by precedent not to rely on the
Guarantee Clause, in 1962 in Baker v. Carr, the U.S. Supreme Court
decided that the structure of state governments – namely, whether
their voting rules comported with the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution – were fit for
judicial, rather than merely political, review.202 The U.S. Supreme
Court said:
Clearly, several factors were thought by the Court in Luther to make the
question there ‘political’: the commitment to the other branches of the
decision as to which is the lawful state government; the unambiguous
action by the President, in recognizing the charter government as the
lawful authority; the need for finality in the executive’s decision; and the
lack of criteria by which a court could determine which form of
government was republican. . . . Even though the Court wrote of
unrestrained legislative and executive authority under this Guaranty, thus
making its enforcement a political question, the Court plainly implied that
the political question barrier was no absolute: “Unquestionably a military
government, established as the permanent government of the State, would
not be a republican government, and it would be the duty of Congress to
overthrow it.” Of course, it does not necessarily follow that if Congress
did not act, the Court would. For while the judiciary might be able to
decide the limits of the meaning of ‘republican form,’ and thus the factor
of lack of criteria might fall away, there would remain other possible
barriers to decision because of primary commitment to another branch,
which would have to be considered in the particular fact setting presented.
That was not the only occasion on which this Court indicated that lack of
criteria does not obliterate the Guaranty’s extreme limits: ‘The guaranty is
of a republican form of government. No particular government is
designated as republican, neither is the exact form to be guaranteed, in
201. See OAS Charter, Resolution of Ratification, 96 CONG. REC. 13608 (Aug.
28, 1950) (reporting debate of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee).
202. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 237 (1962).
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any manner especially designated. Here, as in other parts of the
instrument, we are compelled to resort elsewhere to ascertain what was
intended.203

Translated to the OAS Democracy Clause, the possible
significance of this passage is the Guarantee Clause could have been
determinate enough to decide whether a classical coup has occurred,
although it remains unclear whether it could reach other forms of
“unconstitutional alteration.” But this question ultimately never
needed to be reached or resolved. For the Supreme Court then
decided that certain aspects of the question whether a state
government was “republican” in character could be subject to
judicial review under a separate provision of the U.S. Constitution
relating to individual rights. It found in the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution a substantive
individual right in the form of a legally enforceable guarantee that
electoral districts must be configured in accordance with the oneman, one-vote principle.204
It was no accident then that the Supreme Court’s intervention in
state politics in Baker followed almost inexorably from the new view
announced in its Brown v. Board of Education decision in 1954,
post-dating the adoption of the OAS Charter, that separate but equal
education between blacks and whites was no longer tolerable under
the Equal Protection Clause.205 The ripple effects of Brown and
203. Id. at 222 n.48 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (providing past
examples in which the Court had intervened to correct constitutional violations in
matters pertaining to state administration and the officers through whom state
affairs are conducted).
204. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.”).
205. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 483 (1954) (rejecting earlier
precedent under the Fourteenth Amendment and holding that “separate but equal”
school districts based on racial classification violated the constitutional guarantee
of equality of treatment); see also MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS:
RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 95-96, 100 (2000) (suggesting
that racial segregation frustrated the Government’s pursuit of its Cold War aims
because “[r]acial discrimination furnishes grist for the Communist propaganda
mills, and it raises doubts even among friendly nations as to the intensity of our
devotion to the democratic faith”); Mary L. Dudziak, Brown as a Cold War Case,
91 J. AM. HIST. 32, 32 (2004) (explaining that “the American concept and practice
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Baker later enabled the U.S. Congress to enact, and for the Supreme
Court subsequently to affirm, that racial integration in commerce was
necessary for the fashioning of an inter-state market,206 and that
voting rights could not be denied on impermissible grounds (such as
the ability to pay poll taxes).207 Beneath the surface of this legal
doctrine, which included expansive interpretations of the long
dormant congressional authority to “enforce” the Reconstruction
Amendments to the Constitution,208 the Supreme Court’s justification
for intervening in the political process in Brown, Baker, and later
cases was that judicial enforcement had now become politically
possible; the Court, without serious risk of loss of legitimacy, could
now determine that political techniques, such as the distorting (the
so-called “gerrymandering”) of electoral districts, could no longer be
employed to defeat democratic outcomes in the states.
Thus, by the time the Protocol of Washington was submitted to the
U.S. Senate, the pro-democratic implications of this new OAS law
appeared to pose no threat to domestic arrangements. So, unlike the
original Charter, the Protocol did not require a federalism
reservation. The daunting social, economic, and political conflict
that had transformed the United States over the course of two
generations enabled the Supreme Court to legalize democracy in a
fundamentally new way based on new interpretations of long
dormant texts. It goes without saying that, if it took the U.S. two
generations of struggle to turn its Democracy Clause from a
relatively soft transnational instrument into a hard domestic
of democracy within its own territories should acknowledge the necessity of equal
opportunity for all citizens”).
206. Cf. Heart of Atl. Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 241 (1964)
(upholding Congress’s reliance on its power to regulate commerce as the
constitutional basis for the federal government to enact legislation forbidding racial
discrimination in public conveniences that arguably are within the stream of interstate commerce).
207. See, e.g., Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 663 (1966)
(invalidating a poll tax that was considered a denial of equal protection of law
under the Fourteenth Amendment).
208. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 642 (1966) (approving the
application congressionally-enacted voting rights legislation in a context that
arguably did not involve “enforcement” of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments, as required by those grants of legislative authority, but rather the
creation of new substantive rights).
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constitutional mechanism for enforcing democracy, one should not
expect more rapid legalization in OAS or among its Member States.
Ironically, around this time, one leading U.S. constitutional scholar
suggested that the time had finally come for the Supreme Court to
apply the Guarantee Clause as an obligatory, determinate and
enforceable test for democratic processes in the states,209 as if to
suggest that recently-established “hard” concept of legalization of
democracy now enabled the Supreme Court to wipe the legal slate
clean of the evidence of its past accommodations with political
necessity.
But the adoption of the Protocol in the context of the internal
mechanisms for U.S. compliance, namely the Equal Protection
Clause of the 14th Amendment, gives rise to an even greater irony. If
the broad view of the application of the Democratic Charter
advanced now in the case of Venezuela were adopted, it arguably
could have given rise to questions concerning U.S. compliance had
the Democratic Charter been in force during the 2000 presidential
election. Of course, under a narrow theory, like the narrow theory of
the Guarantee Clause to apply only to “military government,” the
Democratic Charter would not have been applicable without a
military coup. Yet, under the broader theory, was the decision of the
Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore on Equal Protection grounds to
terminate the Florida210 recount an “unconstitutional” judicial
“alteration” of the democratic order in the U.S. within the meaning
of the Democratic Charter? But under such a broad theory, by what
criterion would the OAS have determined that a U.S. legal decision - applying the Equal Protection Clause, precisely the constitutional
norm that had served as the modern Democracy Clause of the U.S.
Constitution – was itself a violation of the OAS Democracy Clause?
One wonders whether or not, had similar facts arisen in some
hypothetical Latin American country, would the U.S. have asserted
that international supervision was required to ensure that the
209. See Erwin Chermerinsky, Cases Under the Guarantee Clause Should Be
Justiciable, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 849, 869 (1994).
210. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 98-99 (2000) (relying on the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to hold invalid the procedures
imposed by the Florida Supreme Court for a recount in the State’s disputed
election for electors to the Electoral College that would select the U.S. President).
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judiciary was not unconstitutionally intervening in that state’s
electoral system to overturn a candidate elected with a majority of
the popular vote (again, in accordance with the one-person, one-vote
weighing principle)?
The hypothetical raises an important, cautionary question about
Democracy Clauses in international instruments, such as the OAS
Charter. Setting aside the legitimacy of exercising discretion to
interpret the OAS withdrawal clause on the basis of a strong
interpretation of the OAS Democracy Clause, one that incorporates
most of achievements that took the better part of two generations in
the United States, the effectiveness of doing so might still be in
question. Surely, for the U.S. at least, any OAS intervention under
the Democratic Charter would have delegitimized the OAS
Democracy Clause and reduced U.S. support for both the OAS and
its efforts to promote democracy. Would the U.S. have withdrawn
from OAS, as it did from the International Court of Justice after the
Court determined it had jurisdiction to adjudicate Nicaragua’s claims
against the U.S.211 Would a broad interpretation then actually have
furthered democracy in the long run, since provoking withdrawal
would not have been without costs to the legitimacy of the norm?
Might not a narrower interpretation of the Democracy Clause in the
short run have had better long run effects in promoting democracy?
Modern rational choice theory offers a potential line of analysis of
this question; and that line of analysis suggests why restrained
interpretation may be a better way to promote democracy rather than
a legally plausible, but arguably illegitimate, expansive interpretation
of the OAS Democracy Clause and its withdrawal clause that would
make full compliance with the Democracy Clause an essential
condition of withdrawal.

IV.

A RATIONAL CHOICE ACCOUNT OF
WITHDRAWAL CLAUSES

Traditionally, international law scholars have not given
withdrawal clauses the attention they deserve, because (in the
suggestive metaphor of one scholar) they considered it impolitic to
211. See generally Abram Chayes, Nicaragua, the United States, and the World
Court, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1445, 1445-46 (1985).
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discuss terms for a possible future divorce on the wedding day.212
Rational choice theory now offers a new of thinking about
withdrawal clauses that, while intuitively plausible to negotiators of
all agreements, has only recently received serious attention in
international law213 and international relations scholarship.214
Properly drafted withdrawal clauses, it is argued, increase adherence
to treaties and the joint cooperative gains they supply by reducing the
legal uncertainty costs that states perceive ex ante of the costs they
will suffer ex post from changing circumstances that increase the
costs of their compliance or reduce the benefits of their continued
participation in a treaty or regime.215 The concept draws on insights
reached in related areas of international law not involving treaty
termination.216 But its logic extends to full-blown withdrawal
212. Lawrence Helfer, Terminating Treaties, in THE OXFORD GUIDE TO
TREATIES 634, 634 (Duncan B. Hollis ed., 2012) [hereinafter Helfer, Terminating
Treaties].
213. Laurence R. Helfer, Exiting Treaties, 91 VA. L. REV. 1579, 1581-83 (2005)
[hereinafter Helfer, Existing Treaties].
214. See BARBARA KOREMENOS, THE CONTINENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW:
EXPLAINING AGREEMENT DESIGN 140-57 (2016) [hereinafter KOREMENOS, COIL]
(discussing withdrawal clauses, noting that the longer than usual duration of the
OAS withdrawal clause); see also id. at 145-46 (noting there are two kinds of
commitment problems that can encourage defections: the first is external, in the
sense that a withdrawing state might seek to obtain an unjustified advantage of
benefits previously received without compensating its treaty partners for
cooperation; and the second in internal, in the sense that a longer period of
withdrawal may give domestic forces seeking not to withdraw an opportunity to
persuade domestic factions seeking withdrawal to reverse course).
215. See KOREMENOS, COIL, supra note 214, at 140-57 (observing that clauses
“are generally incorporated as a protection from shocks that alter a state’s basic
interest in cooperation”); see also Helfer, Exiting Treaties, supra note 213, at
1599-1601 (hypothesizing that foremost challenge that treaty negotiators face is
setting optimal conditions on exit ex ante in order to deter opportunistic uses of an
exit clause ex post after the treaty has entered into force); see generally Helfer,
Terminating Treaties, supra note 212, at 634, 648 (suggesting that exit clauses that
are lenient leave too much room for self-serving withdrawals and clauses that are
strict may deter parties from entering the agreement).
216. See Alan O. Sykes, Protectionism as a “Safeguard”: A Positive Analysis of
the GATT “Escape Clause” with Normative Speculations, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 255,
284, 289 (1991) (asserting that the central insight of this new literature was
developed in relation to the GATT “escape clause,” which, while not a withdrawal
clause as such, in respect of allowing a state to free itself from legal obligations
operates in the same way as a withdrawal clause, but rather promoted free trade
commitments ex ante by reducing their costs ex post).
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clauses, suggesting that a properly drafted “pre-nuptial” agreement
can indeed increase the likelihood of a mutually satisfactory
marriage.
This increased attention may also have been stimulated by the
recent salient experience of North Korea’s (Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea or DPRK).217 Rational choice theory turns on a
game-theoretic analysis of international cooperation and defection
decisions played out over time, which for purposes of this discussion
defining cooperation as adhering to a treaty (such as one, like the
OAS, promoting democracy) and defection as withdrawing from
such a treaty. (Of course, additional, more-nuanced forms of
cooperation and defection would be relevant to a deeper rational
choice analysis of a particular treaty or other regime.218) It may be
useful first to examine the case of the DPRK’s withdrawal, including
the effects of the response of NPT parties to the DPRK threat of
withdrawal and ultimate withdrawal on the NPT itself. Despite the
obvious differences between the two cases, comparative analysis will
to some extent inform a rational choice analysis of withdrawal from
the OAS.

A. NPT WITHDRAWAL AND ITS LEGAL EFFECTS FOR
DPRK RIGHTS AND DUTIES
The legal context for analyzing the comparative effects of the
OAS Charter and NPT withdrawal clauses includes three important
background concepts in the law of withdrawal, which are reflected in
the VCLT.219 First, including a withdrawal clause in a multilateral
treaty remedies a defect under the law of breach that would impede a
nation’s right to withdraw from a treaty. In a multilateral treaty, a
217. See Helfer, Exiting Treaties, supra note 213, at 1619-20 (exploring the
“phenomenon” of unilateral exit from international agreements and particularly
discussing the DPRK withdrawal from the NPT).
218. ALBERT HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE
IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 162 (1970).
219. See Richard D. Kearney & Robert E. Dalton, The Treaty on Treaties, 64
AM. J. INT’L L. 495, 539 (1970) (explaining that although the OAS Charter predated the VCLT by more than two decades, the NPT was drafted at roughly the
same time the VCLT was concluded, but concepts in the VCLT are relevant
because it is generally deemed to reflect the customary international law of
treaties).
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party must show that breach by a defaulting state “radically changes
the position of every party with respect to the further performance of
its obligations under the treaty” (although a “specially affected”
states may withdraw without needing to satisfy this criterion).220
Second, rebus sic stantibus, by contrast, which appears to have been
the primary rationale for the inclusion of a withdrawal clause in the
OAS Charter under the Argentine proposal,221 either in a bilateral or
multilateral instrument permits withdrawal under stringent conditions
relating to the occurrence of unforeseen events undercutting the
essential basis for the party’s consent and that radically transforms
the party’s executory obligations.222 Third, Article 70 of the Vienna
Convention provides:
Unless a treaty otherwise provides or the parties otherwise agree, the
termination of a treaty under its provisions or in accordance with the
present Convention: (a) Releases the parties from any obligation further to
perform the treaty; [but] (b) Does not affect any right, obligation or legal
situation of the parties created through the execution of the treaty prior to
its termination.223

Application of Article 70’s principles does not turn on whether the
treaty is bilateral or multilateral,224 or on whether its parties include
an international organization.”225 In sum, the residual effects of
220. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 15, at 346, art.
60, ¶ 2(c).
221. ACTAS Y DOCUMENTOS, supra note 49, at 513 (discussing the Argentine
proposal’s intent to rely on the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus).
222. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 15, at 347, art.
62.
223. See id. at 349, art. 70, ¶ 1 (discussing that the Article only address the case
of rights derived from performance, thus leaving the question of rights that flow
from breach by a defaulting state, including even a withdrawing state, to the to the
law of state responsibility).
224. See id. ¶ 2 (“If a State denounces or withdraws from a multilateral treaty,
paragraph 1 applies in the relations between that State and each of the other parties
to the treaty from the date when such denunciation or withdrawal takes effect.”).
225. See Agreement Between the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the International
Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/403 (Apr. 10, 1992), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 319 (1994

) [hereinafter
DPRK/IAEA Safeguards Agreement] (stating that the IAEA-DPRK Safeguards
Agreement pursuant to the NPT is not a treaty between states, but rather an
agreement between a state and an international organization, although the DPRK
under the NPT owes a duty to each NPT party to enter into such an agreement); see
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treaty withdrawal in general are independent of whether it is pursuant
to rebus, material breach, or a withdrawal clause that is conceptually
dependent on either or both rebus and material breach rationales.
Both bilateral and multilateral settings, withdrawal clauses
contemplate a right to withdraw for good reason, but they also reflect
some effort to stabilize expectations created, or rights that vested,
while a withdrawing state was still a party to the treaty.
In the case of the DPRK’s withdrawal from the NPT, it is notable
that the NPT divided states into two groups: so called “Nuclear
Weapon States” (NWS), which had already publicly detonated a
nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967 (the U.S., Great
Britain, France, PRC, and Soviet Union, which eventually was
succeeded in its NWS status by the Russian Federation); and socalled “Non-Nuclear Weapon States” (NNWS),226 which eventually
came to include the DPRK.227 These NNWS’s were required to
accept an intrusive inspections regime under an International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards Agreement.228 The NPT, unlike
the OAS Charter, also expressly provides a party a “self-judging”
right to withdraw upon notice when “it decides that extraordinary
events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized
[its] supreme interest.”229
In 1993, shortly after the IAEA Safeguards Agreement entered
also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 15, at 333, arts. 1,
2(1)(a) (requiring that a treaty is technically a written agreement that is settled
between “states”); U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.129/15 (1986), reprinted in
25 I.L.M. 543 (1986) (relying on the VCLT principles stated in article 70 does not
turn on this fact because the parallel principles of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties between States and international organizations, which might also
be deemed to reflect customary international law, would yield the same analysis
required by the VCLT).
226. See NPT, supra note 28, 21 U.S.T. at 483.
227. NPT, supra note 28, 21 U.S.T. at 487, art. III(4) (explaining that NNWS
will arrange agreements with the IAEA to meet the requirements of Article III
either individually or together with others states); see also Fact Sheet on DPRK
Nuclear Safeguards, International Atomic Energy Agency, https://www.iaea.org/
newscenter/focus/dprk/fact-sheet-on-dprk-nuclear-safeguards (last visited Sept. 30,
2017 [hereinafter IAEA Fact Sheet on DPRK Nuclear Safeguards] (reporting the
DPRK’s adherence to the NPT in 1985 and its finally concluding in 1992 the NPTrequired IAEA Safeguards Agreement).
228. See DPRK/IAEA Safeguards Agreement, supra note 225, at 322-23.
229. See NPT, supra note 28, 21 U.S.T. at 493, art. X(1).
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into force and based on concerns that the DPRK was already in
material breach of its obligations, the IAEA requested a “special
inspections” under the DPRK/IAEA Safeguards Agreement.230 The
DPRK then gave the required “three months” notice to the Security
Council and all other NPT Parties of its intention to withdraw.231
This raised at least two questions: whether the withdrawal clause
was, as it appeared to be, truly “self-judging”; and, second, if it was
self-judging, whether there would be any continuing effects under
Article 70 of the VCLT notwithstanding the DPRK’s withdrawal
from the NPT, as well as the consequences for potential breach of the
IAEA Safeguards Agreement and the NPT under the law of state
responsibility. 232 Then, in the face of the implied threat of sanctions
or worse when the UN Security Council called upon it to reverse
course,233 the DPRK “suspended” its withdrawal the day before it
was to have taken effect.234 Negotiations followed, leading to a
politically binding “Framework Agreement” between the U.S. and
the DPRK, which provided for negotiated partial compliance by the
DPRK with its safeguards obligations in return for economic and
civil nuclear aid.235 Although not a treaty creating obligations under
230. See IAEA, supra note 227.
231. See NPT, supra note 28, 21 U.S.T. at 493, art. X(1).
232. See generally Antonio F. Perez, Survival of Rights Under the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty: Withdrawal and the Continuing Right of International
Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards, 31 VA. J. INT’L L. 749, 777 (1994) (positing
that if it were a fully self-judging clause, it would not render the whole agreement
a nullity because there is still relevant legal value).
233. See S.C. Res. 825, U.N. Doc. S/RES/825, at 2 (1993).
234. Report by the Director General [of the IAEA] on the Implementation of the
Agreement between the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of
Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (Sept. 16, 1993), in Note by the Secretary General, U.N. Doc. S/26456,
appendix ¶ 25 (Sept. 17, 1993) (stating that DPRK’s decision with “to suspend,
[will last] as long as it considers it necessary”); see U.S.-North Korean Declaration
of June 11, 1993, ARTS CONTROL TODAY, Jul.-Aug. 1993, at 19 (elucidating that
the announcement was contained in the first joint U.S.-North Korean statement, in
which both countries restated “assurances against the threat and use of force,
including nuclear weapons”).
235. See The Agreed Framework to Negotiate Resolution of the Nuclear Issue
on the Korean Peninsula (Oct. 20, 1994), reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 603, 604 (1995)
(explaining that the United States undertook to make arrangements to provide
North Korea with a light-water reactor power plant project having a total
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international law, the Framework Agreement was structured so that
the benefits provided to the DPRK could be linked to its eventual
compliance with its safeguards obligations.236
Implementing the Agreed Framework, the U.S. then arranged for
the establishment of the Korean Energy Development Corporation
[KEDO] to build peaceful nuclear power reactors in the DPRK,
under yet another politically binding instrument implementing the
Agreed Framework, but now involving the other most directly
affected NPT parties, South Korea and Japan, and enlisting the
support of the European Union.237 Thus, with the situation appearing
to be normalized, on the eve of a conference scheduled in 1995 to
determine whether or not the NPT would terminate or continue in
perpetuity,238 a central challenge to the continuation of the NPT
appeared to have been averted, thus permitting its indefinite
generating capacity by a target date of 2003 of approximately 2,000 megawatts,
and in exchange North Korea, upon receipt of assurances for the provision of lightwater reactors and for arrangements for interim energy alternatives, would freeze
its graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities and ultimately dismantle
them); see also Marian Nash, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating
to International Law: Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 366,
374 (1995) (reporting testimony of Secretary of State Christopher Before the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on January 24, 1995, in which Secretary
Christopher maintained that North Korean compliance with the IAEA’s earlier
special inspection request was an essential part of the Agreed Framework).
236. See generally Testimony of Ambassador-at-Large Robert L. Gallucci
Before the East Asian and Pacific Sub-Committee of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on U.S.-North Korea Nuclear Agreement, Federal News Service (Dec.
1, 1994) (observing that the United States was therefore not legally obligated to
make available funds for the provision of the light-water based reactors the Agreed
Framework envisioned would ultimately be made available to North Korea or for
interim energy supplies to substitute from nuclear energy North Korea claimed it
had forborne through closing down its graphite-based reactors).
237. See Japan-Republic of Korea-United States Agreement on the
Establishment of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (Mar. 9,
1995), reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 603, 604 (1995) [hereinafter KEDO Agreement].
238. See NPT, supra note 28, 21 U.S.T. at 494, art. X (“Twenty-five years after
the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether
the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an
additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the
Parties to the Treaty.”); see also Interview with Thomas Graham, General Counsel,
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (July/Aug. 1994) (explaining that the
conference was the only chance for the international community to extend the NPT
and that any decision taken would be binding on all parties).
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extension pursuant to Article X(2).239 Thereafter, when the DPRK
failed to comply with its “obligations” even under the Agreed
Framework and when the benefits the DPRK had thought it secured
through the Agreed Framework failed to materialize, the DPRK
ultimately withdrew from the NPT by notice on January 10, 2003 -with effect the following day, argued the DPRK, because (rather than
providing a new notice of withdrawal) it had merely retracted its
prior “suspension” of its nearly effective 1993 notice of
withdrawal.240
Thus, the DPRK’s purported withdrawal finally raised the
questions whether the withdrawal was, in fact, effective and, if so,
whether or not NPT parties or the IAEA could continue to assert
rights to the full implementation of the terms of the IAEA-DPRK
Safeguards Agreement. In the immediate aftermath of the DPRK’s
withdrawal from the NPT, the IAEA’s Director General, Mohammed
El-Baradei, appeared to hesitate to find that the DPRK would be
subject to continuing IAEA supervision, alluding instead to the role
of the Security Council in enforcing compliance.241 Under the NPT,
even after its indefinite extension, the Parties continued to meet
every five years to review the operation of the treaty,242 thus
affording them an institutional opportunity to reach consensus on an
authoritative interpretation of the treaty. In the immediate aftermath
of the DPRK’s withdrawal, there appears to have been some explicit
support for a theory based on VCLT article 70.243 France, in
239. Decisions and Resolution Adopted at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension
Conference, in 1995 NPT REVIEW AND EXTENSION CONFERENCE 364, 367 (1995),
http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/npt95rc.pdf?_=1316545320.
240. See IAEA Fact Sheet on DPRK Nuclear Safeguards, supra note 227; see
also ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 282 (2d ed. 2007)
(noting the DPRK’s rationale for withdrawal as U.S. military exercises and hostile
resolutions adopted by the IAEA).
241. Interview by Emma Belcher with Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, Director
General, International Atomic Energy Agency (Dec. 2, 2003) in 28 FLETCHER
FORUM OF WORLD AFFAIRS, Winter 2004, at 29 (arguing that withdrawal from
treaty obligations that can threaten the security of the international community
requires Security Council intervention).
242. NPT, supra note 28, 21 U.S.T. at 492.
243. See Joint working paper submitted by the members of the Non-Proliferation
and Disarmament Initiative, ¶ 3, NPT/CONF.2005/WP.16 (Apr. 28, 2005),
https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/327/03/PDF/
N0532703.pdf?OpenElement (arguing that article 70 of the Vienna Convention on

2017]

DEMOCRACY CLAUSES IN THE AMERICAS

465

addition, advanced a view that the DPRK was subject to continuing
IAEA supervision that was consistent with a vested rights approach
but arguably reached beyond it to imply a continuing IAEA right of
supervision and control of nuclear activities in the DPRK.244 Later,
the NWS’s, which happen to be the same states that compose the
Permanent Five of the UN Security Council, made a strong joint
statement asserting their view that, while the right to withdraw
should not be revised, “States should support measures to prevent its
abuse” and they [the P-5] at the 2015 Review Conference “would
make efforts to broaden consensus on . . . the consequences of
withdrawal.”245 That consensus did indeed conclude that the DPRK
had an unquestioned right to withdraw in the exercise of its own
sovereignty and judgment, stating:
The Conference reaffirms that each party shall in exercising its national
sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that
extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty have
jeopardized its supreme interests. The Conference also reaffirms that
pursuant to article X notice of such withdrawal shall be given to all other
parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three
months in advance, and that such notice shall include a statement of the
extraordinary events the State party regards as having jeopardized its
supreme interests.246

the Law of Treaties provides that withdrawal from a treaty does not absolve a party
from performing any obligations that accrued prior to a valid exercise of its right to
withdraw).
244. Statement by the Head of the French Delegation, First Meeting of the
Preparatory Committee for the 2010 NPT Review Conference, ¶ 18, (Apr. 30-May
11, 2017), http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2007/statements/France_E_01_05_
am.pdf (affirming that “international responsibility of a State remains unimpaired
for [violations] . . . committed prior to withdrawal,” and “that any State
withdrawing from the Treaty must freeze, under IAEA control, and then dismantle
or return, all nuclear goods acquired for peaceful uses from third countries prior to
withdrawal”).
245. Statement by the People’s Republic of China, France, the Russian
Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the
United States of America to the 2015 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons Review Conference, ¶ 24, (May 5, 2015), http://www.un.org/
en/conf/npt/2015/statements/pdf/P5_en.pdf (explaining that any withdrawal must
be done in accordance with article X of the NPT).
246. 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons, NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I), 18, ¶ 118 (June
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However, the consensus also appeared to fail to reach a continuing
right of supervision under the general principles of Article 70 of the
VCLT or under a theory based on the specific requirements of the
NPT:
The Conference notes that numerous States recognize that the right of
withdrawal is established in the provisions of the Treaty. There were
divergent views regarding its interpretation with respect to other relevant
international law. The Conference notes that many States underscore that
under international law a withdrawing party is still responsible for
violations of the Treaty committed prior to its withdrawal, and that if done
in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty, such withdrawal would
not affect any right, obligation or legal situation between the withdrawing
State and each of the other States parties created through the execution of
the Treaty prior to withdrawal, including those related to the required
IAEA safeguards.247

Also, following the lead of the IAEA Director General, the
Conference emphasized the role of the Security Council once a state
withdrew.248 The role going forward for the parties supplying
nuclear material, technology or equipment, the Conference
concluded, was only to enter into new agreements or amend earlier
agreements to ensure that that a withdrawing state would not gain an
advantage from prior benefits received,249 permitting the negative
inference that the DPRK could so benefit in the absence of new
agreements.
What does this mean for the DPRK’s perceived costs of
withdrawal? Admittedly, whether or not the DPRK continues to be
under a technical legal obligation to submit to IAEA inspections
remains in dispute. Although the most recent NPT Review
Conference statement seems to suggest otherwise. However, it is
2015),
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=NPT/CONF.2010/
50%20(VOL.I) [hereinafter 2010 Review Conference Final Document].
247. Id. at 18, ¶ 119.
248. Id. at 19, ¶ 120 (noting that many states affirmed the Security Council’s
responsibility pursuant to the United Nations Charter).
249. Id. ¶ 121 (“The Conference notes that numerous States acknowledge that
nuclear supplying States can consider incorporating dismantling and/or return
clauses in the event of withdrawal in arrangements or contracts concluded with
other States parties as appropriate in accordance with international law and
national legislation.”).
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possible that the DPRK’s prior breach of its obligations under the
law of state responsibility might, give the non-defaulting state parties
or the IAEA the right to a remedy, under French theory, extending to
continued inspections or some lesser remedy of restitution for
benefits received while the DPRK was a party. Yet, such rights
would be so lacking in legalization’s characteristics – that they are
binding, determinate, and enforceable – that it is hard to maintain
that they would affect the DPRK’s calculus in assessing the costs and
benefits of withdrawal. Moreover, turning to strategic effects, the
DPRK’s larger expected cost from stimulating the withdrawal of
other states would also seems relatively slight, at least as of the time
it withdrew, since the DPRK may have been able to free ride on the
U.S. security umbrella for Japan and South Korea to obtain the
benefits of their continued membership in the NPT in NNWS status
(namely, assurance that neither of its neighbors would acquire
nuclear weapons).250 Finally, the DPRK’s indifference to reputational
costs in the international or regional community for its noncompliance, given the so-called Hermit Kingdom’s isolation, perhaps
makes the situation of the DPRK a special case.251 The DPRK seems
to have had little to lose and, through the potential acquisition of
nuclear weapons, much to gain. When the limited gains the DPRK
anticipated from the Agreed Framework did not materialized,
rational choice theory seems to provide a compelling account for its
decision to withdraw from the NPT.
More critically, the NPT parties offered the DPRK substantial
benefits over a ten-year period under the Agreed Framework and
KEDO, in a failed effort to induce the DPRK to reverse course and
remain a NNWS under NPT, signaling to potentially withdrawing
parties that threat of withdrawal could serve as bargaining leverage
to secure ancillary benefits.252 Perhaps even more importantly, the
250. See infra text accompanying notes 262-63.
251. See generally ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A
RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY 81, 86-87 (2008) (focusing on reputational effects of
reliability of compliance in future iterations of cooperative behavior).
252. Statement by the Head of the French Delegation, supra note 244, ¶ 18 (“It
would be unacceptable for any State, after having benefited from the provisions
and cooperation defined in Article IV, in order to acquire nuclear materials,
facilities and technology, only to withdraw subsequently from the Treaty and use
them for military purposes.”).

468

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[33:2

NWS’s and their allies at successive NPT Review Conferences
launched a campaign to achieve consensus adoption of a broad right
to continuing IAEA monitoring of nuclear activities in the DPRK,253
only to see their views rejected and a contrary consensus emerge.
Although their legal position may have been more than plausible,
their aggressive assertion of a maximalist interpretation of their legal
rights rebounded against the NPT regime itself, resulting in a
systemic dilution of perceived deterrence of noncompliance with
NPT obligations by reducing the costs of withdrawal for all future
noncomplying parties. This may have been an unnecessary and
imprudent self-inflicted wound the NPT could not afford in the
aftermath of the DPRK’s withdrawal.
Admittedly, the OAS withdrawal clause contains language that
could be construed to be more forceful than the NPT’s
requirements.254 At the same time, the resistance that the NNWS
showed to accepting a strong interpretation of the DPRK’s
obligations upon withdrawal suggests an underlying dynamic that
needs to be explored from a rational choice perspective, one that
could inform analysis of whether or not the OAS and its Member
States should advance a broad interpretation of Article 143 to require
full compliance with the OAS Democracy Clause before the
Government of Venezuela (“GOV”) can implement its withdrawal
from the OAS.255

B. RATIONAL CHOICE AND VENEZUELA’S
WITHDRAWAL FROM THE OAS
There is one important similarity between the DPRK and
Venezuelan cases: the possibility for what rational choice theory
253. 2010 Review Conference Final Document, supra note 246, at 18, ¶ 118
(noting that the conference urged the DPRK to fulfill its commitments, including
abandonment of nuclear weapons).
254. Protocol of Amendment to the Charter of the Organization of American
States “Protocol of Managua,” Charter of the Organization of American States, art.
143,
A-41
(June
10,
1993),
http://www.oas.org/en/sla/dil/docs/inter_american_treaties_A-41_charter_OAS.pdf
(affirming that only after two years from giving notice to the General Secretariat
and after fulfilling its obligations under the charter that a state will cease to belong
to the OAS).
255. See infra text accompanying notes 262-63.
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would denominate “opportunistic” use of the right to withdraw, what
the NWS/P-5 called “abuse” of the NPT withdrawal clause.256 Two
branches of rational choice analysis, game theory and bargaining
theory, offer compatible accounts of these characterizations.
From a rational choice, game-theoretic standpoint, “abuse” or
“opportunism” essentially is a claim that the GOV has received the
benefits of OAS cooperation, including but not limited to the benefits
that exceed the value of the GOV’s unpaid dues. Now, in the
language of game theory, it is defecting, with the effect of achieving
opportunistic gains and imposing upon the OAS the so-called
Sucker’s Payoff.257 Properly structured and implemented withdrawal
clauses, by contrast, allow states to lawfully avoid compliance in
response to unforeseeable changes of circumstances (the so-called
rebus sic stantibus doctrine), without signaling that cooperation in
general is about to unravel.258 Further negotiation with the GOV
over the terms of continued cooperation will simply incentivize
further gain-seeking behavior, if the GOV is pursuing an
opportunistic strategy rather than responding to unanticipated costs
of compliance.
Bargaining theory may well provide even greater insights in the
OAS negotiation with the GOV over the terms of the GOV’s
withdrawal. In general terms, in the language of bargaining theory,
each party will have a best-alternative-to-a-negotiated-settlement (a
so-called BATNA), which strongly influences the price at which a
party will no longer enter into an agreement, its so-called
“reservation price” -- the point at which not reaching an agreement is
superior to reaching an agreement; thus, the value of a party’s
BATNA determines the degree to which it is willing to make
concessions in a negotiation, because a weak BATNA implies a
greater willingness to pay to enter into an agreement, meaning a
256. See GUZMAN, supra note 251, at 81, 86-87 (explaining that for some states
reputational consequences to withdrawal have little or no effect and as such direct
sanctions must be applied).
257. See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984)
(discussing the Prisoner’s Dilemma and empirical results of different strategies in
iterative games for surmounting the incentive to defect).
258. See KOREMENOS, COIL, supra note 214, at 133 (arguing that agreements
that are depicted as having enforcement issues and uncertainty about the state of
the world are more likely to include escape clauses).
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higher reservation price; while a strong BATNA implies a greater
ability to insist on concessions by the other party, meaning a lower
willingness to pay and lower reservation price. In the language of
negotiation theory, the quality of one’s BATNA is a measure of
negotiating power, meaning the power to obtain a greater share of the
benefits, or “cooperative surplus,” of an agreement.259
From the perspective of bargaining theory perspective, could view
the underlying dispute between the OAS and the GOV as the
negotiation of the terms of the GOV’s compliance with the OAS
Democracy Clause. But this may be equivalent to negotiating the
very meaning of the OAS Democracy Clause, since OAS practice
with respect to Venezuela will serve as a precedent for future cases.
The OAS will bargain for increased compliance by Venezuela, and
the GOV will bargain for a relaxation of the meaning of the
Democracy Clause to validate the GOV’s conduct. For the OAS,
suspending the GOV is its BATNA to an agreement with the GOV
relaxing the requirement of the OAS Democracy Clause; and, for the
GOV, withdrawal from the OAS is its BATNA to an agreement with
the OAS requiring it to increase its compliance with the OAS
Democracy Clause. But the question is more complex than this first
approximation, because the value of each BATNA depends on the
precise consequences of suspension and withdrawal. Thus, by taking
the position that only time and the payment of dues define its
BATNA, and communicating its withdrawal in a manner that appears
to suggest that it perceives as minimal its reputational costs among
OAS states (and globally) for withdrawal, the GOV is attempting to
increase the value of its BATNA. (The continuing debate with
MERCOSUR countries over the legality of Venezuela’s suspension
from MERCOSUR is illustrative of this strategy.)260 In general,
however, it seems fair to conclude that the GOV’s notice of
withdrawal has the effect of reducing the value of the GOV’s
BATNA as it seeks to negotiate the GOV’s compliance with the
OAS Democracy Clause during the period before that withdrawal
259. See generally Russell Korobkin, A Positive Theory of Legal Negotiation, 88
GEO. L.J. 1789, 1791-92 (2000) (describing a dichotomy of zone definition/surplus
allocation that creates a new theoretical structure for viewing the legal negotiation
process).
260. See supra notes 3-12.
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will take effect.
In short, if the GOV perceives its BATNA as strong, and the OAS
perceives its BATNA as weak, any negotiation between the OAS and
GOV over the terms of the GOV’s compliance with the OAS
Democracy Clause (or, equivalently, the meaning of the OAS
Democracy Clause itself and future precedential effects) will suffer
from a dramatic shift in negotiating power from OAS towards the
GOV. Like the case of the DPRK and NPT, this shift in negotiating
power may inspire OAS to dilute the meaning of the OAS
Democracy Clause in order to persuade GOV to suspend its
withdrawal. Like Cuba, which was able to secure a commitment
from OAS to negotiate terms of re-integration in OAS that implied a
“negotiation” with Cuba about those terms,261 Venezuela may well be
pursuing a strategy of reducing OAS’ own commitment to its
Democracy Clause.
The dilution of the value of the OAS Democracy Clause may be
permanent. Any subsequent efforts by OAS and OAS Member
States to restore the value of the OAS Democracy Clause to
counteract the effect of concessions made to the GOV to persuade it
to revoke or suspend its withdrawal, if the case of the DPRK is
illustrative, will meet with failure. Other states facing the same
incentives that would lead them to seek a weaker version of the OAS
Democracy Clause -- like NPT-NNWS, fearing the risk of
dissolution of the NPT regime, a potentially-threatening postdissolution environment, and their consequential interest in
maximizing their freedom of action in the event of withdrawal -may have a common incentive to seek to reduce the costs of
withdrawal. These conclusions also seem to be consistent with a
rational choice approach to withdrawal clauses in treaties, such as the
NPT and other treaties that furnish “public goods,” which are
benefits from with a withdrawing state cannot be excluded even after
withdrawal. If under the democratic peace hypothesis,262 the nonthreatening international environment the OAS Democracy Clause
261. Thirty-Ninth Regular Session of the General Assembly, OAS, Resolution
on
Cuba,
¶
2,
AG/RES.
2438
(June
3,
2009),
https://www.oas.org/columbus/Cuba.asp (noting that Cuba’s participation in the
OAS is the result of process of dialogue).
262. See supra text accompanying notes 164-69.
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secures in the region is such a public good, Venezuela will not
perceive diminished external security as a potential cost of
withdrawal. Repeated instances of this logic by other states will
ultimately undermine the “public good” advanced by the OAS
Democracy Clause. Indeed, rational theory foresees precisely these
special challenges in constructing optimal withdrawal clauses in the
case of treaties involving public goods, where withdrawing states can
“free ride” on benefits provided by the treaty even after withdrawal
and the private benefits that flow from withdrawal may be large, thus
incentivizing “opportunistic” or “abusive” withdrawal.263
That said, admittedly, one ought to be cautious in comparing the
public goods character of the NPT with that of OAS. First, the
incentives for withdrawal may be substantially greater when the
issue is state survival rather than survival of a particular kind of
government. This is intuitively plausible in the case of the NPT,
when the question of the possession of nuclear weapons, as is
certainly the case for the NPT, is state survival and private incentives
become infinite. Yet, the regime leadership might perceive as
practically of infinite value the internal threat of regime termination,
even if state survival were not actually in jeopardy. Mathematicians
do sometimes conceive of values that are each infinite, yet not equal.
Lawyers and political scientists need not deal with such abstractions,
even under rational choice theory. It is simply enough to note that
the incentives applicable to public goods treaties, such as the NPT, at
least tend to move in the same direction in other public goods
treaties, such as OAS. It is fair to conclude that the public goods
character of the NPT and OAS suggest incentives that under rational
choice theory make efforts to negotiate the continued membership of
a state seeking withdrawal an unwise expenditure of resources, with
greater expected costs and expected benefits.
Particular facts of the NPT and OAS cases indicate that efforts to
263. See KOREMENOS, COIL, supra note 214, at 146 n.28 (arguing that
difficulties in excluding partners from treaties involving public goods stems from
the impossibility of preventing withdrawing states from “free-riding” on the
contributions of states that remain); see also Hefler, Exiting Treaties, supra note
213, at 1637-38 (arguing states that withdraw or fail to ratify a treaty involving a
public good can still free ride on the cooperation of remaining states without facing
sanctions).
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maintain GOV membership would not yield greater benefits over
costs. It is true that the degree a withdrawing state can free ride on
the international security environment that flows from the continued
existence of the NPT and the OAS Democracy Clause may be
radically different, given the specific contexts of the two situations.
Given U.S. security guarantees and other factors, such as Japan’s
cultural aversion to the possession of nuclear weapons, the NPT has
proven stable in East Asia, notwithstanding the DPRK’s withdrawal.
On the other hand, it is not clear that Venezuela’s security
environment after its withdrawal from OAS will remain equally
stable.264 That said, there is no immediate evidence that the
dissolution of democracy in Venezuela will have cascading effects
among other OAS Member States.
In sum, it is certainly reasonable to question whether the
predictions suggested by rational choice theory of excessive
withdrawal are not as robust as they appear at first inspection, and to
doubt that analogies drawn from the case of the North Korea’s
withdrawal from NPT are only moderately persuasive. That said,
both theory and practice identify no significant gains from efforts to
maintain the membership of the withdrawing states, at least in terms
of immediate de-stabilizing regional effects, but they do pose
significant risk of regime dilution. Just as it was true for the NPT in
the face of DPRK withdrawal, an OAS effort to advance an
expansive view of the requirement for withdrawal so as to require
complete compliance with a maximal interpretation of the
requirements of the OAS Democracy Clause might well break
consensus among OAS Member States, and an attempt to negotiate
the GOV’s continued membership would necessarily dilute the
perceived requirements of the OAS Charter. Thus, even if the text,
negotiating history, subsequent agreement, subsequent practice, and
relevant rules of international law supply a context that could support
such a broad interpretation, to either advancing such an interpretation
or negotiating its relaxation would be counter-productive.

264. Sea of Blood, supra note 177 (noting recent Peruvian suggestions of the
threat posed to the region by Venezuela’s de-stabilization).

474

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[33:2

V. CODA: RISKING THE GOV’S MEMBERSHIP TO
SAVE THE OAS DEMOCRACY CLAUSE
In general, recent scholarship draws attention to the risk that
excessive claims based on weakly-establishing international law
norms are now tending to reduce the legitimacy of international law,
not only in the area of the weakly-established claims but also in
international law as a whole.265 This may reflect larger structural
considerations, as U.S. post-Cold War relative power declines.
Hegemonic stability theory -- which posits that post-World War II
international institution building reflected U.S. hegemonic interest in
stabilizing the global environment of peace, security and free trade,
since the U.S. gained a disproportionate share of its benefits266 -might have explained the rise of the OAS. The post-Cold War
resurgence of U.S. hegemony, together with the U.S.’s increasing
commitment to democracy,267 might similarly have explained the
strengthening of the OAS Democracy Clause as a means through
which post-Cold War U.S. hegemony could be maintained. If so,
one could expect declining U.S. interest and ability to invest in the
creation and maintenance of institutions,268 such as the OAS and its
Democracy Clause. Instead, U.S. attention will turn to the so-called
“Thucydides trap,” in which accommodation or resistance to China’s
rising power269 becomes a more salient question that continued
265. See Wuerth, supra note 187, at 36-37 (advancing a so-called “broken
windows” theory of international law, in which repeated findings of low-level
international-law breaking de-legitimizes international law generally).
266. ROBERT GILPIN, U.S. POWER AND MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 138-39
(1979) (arguing that after WWII American corporate expansion around the world
served the interests of the United States); Robert Gilpin, The Theory of Hegemonic
War, 4 J. INTERDISC. HIST. 591, 610 (1988) (arguing that following WWII the
breakdown of the European political order and the new order based on AmericanSoviet bipolarity maintained peace and undermined the concept of war as a means
to settle conflicts).
267. See supra text accompanying note 209.
268. See ROBERT KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN
THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY 183-84 (1984) (arguing that U.S.-sponsored
international institutions will survive declining U.S. hegemony).
269. See GRAHAM ALLISON, DESTINED FOR WAR: CAN AMERICA AND CHINA
ESCAPE THUCYDIDES’S TRAP xvi-xx (2017) (noting prescriptions for
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universalization of Western democratic norms through the
progressive development of international law based on those norms.
What, then, is to be done? In this age of withdrawal, most notably
felt in Europe thorough Brexit,270 and perhaps also risked by
increasing EU supervision of democracy in Central and Eastern
Europe,271 arguably the priority now ought to be avoid damage to
international law norms, including democracy, rather than overreach
and thereby reduce their legitimacy. In the context of promoting
democracy in the Americas, one way to do unforeseeable damage to
the Democracy Clause of the OAS would be to initiate a bargaining
process that is likely to result in its dilution, just as NPT parties
seeking to deter further withdrawals from the NPT after North
Korean withdrawal ultimately succeeded only reducing the level of
consensus of the remaining parties.272 Instead, taking into account
that prior to notice of withdrawal the GOV has not yet been the
subject of sanctions under the Democracy Clause, the OAS and its
Member States could reasonably take a narrow view of the
requirements of withdrawal in this particular case, limiting its scope
to duration and dues. The question of the broader implications of the
withdrawal clause in the case in which a state has already been
subject to sanctions would not arise; the question concerning the
accommodating China’s rising power and avoiding war).
270. See Brendan Simms, Managing Brexit: Leaving on Good Terms, Foreign
Affairs, (Oct 12, 2016), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/unitedkingdom/2016-10-12/managing-brexit (suggesting EU acceptance of UK
withdrawal on reasonable terms).
271. See EU warns Poland over court reforms, RADIO POLAND (Jul. 19, 2017),
http://www.thenews.pl/1/9/Artykul/317047%2CEU-warns- Poland-over- courtreforms (stating “European Commission Vice President Frans Timmermans told
reporters in Brussels that the EU’s executive arm was close to triggering the bloc’s
Article 7 against Poland, which could ultimately result in sanctions,” but reporting
that Poland’s proposed judicial reforms are compatible with current arrangements
in current EU member states).
But see R. Daniel Keleman, Poland’s
Constitutional Crisis: How the Law and Justice Party is Threatening Democracy,
FOREIGN AFF., (Aug. 25, 2016), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/
poland/2016-08-25/polands-constitutional-crisis (suggesting that the Polish
president ignored the EU commission’s threat); Andrew Rettman, Poland belittles
EU action on judicial reform, EU OBSERVER (July 31, 2017), https://euobserver.
com/justice/138646 (suggesting that The EU threat may have well influenced the
Polish President to veto at least one of the problematic, proposed laws).
272. See supra text accompanying notes 226-36.
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meaning of the withdrawal clause and whether or not the Democracy
Clause, including the Democratic Charter, is an obligation that
“arises from the present Charter” would not arise; the question,
therefore, of whether the OAS or the withdrawing state determines
which obligations are within the scope of the withdrawal clause
would also not arise; and, last but not least, the consensus gradually
emerging within the community of remaining OAS Member States
concerning the indispensability of democracy would not be ruptured
(and perhaps not even interrupted). In legal policy, as in so many
things, the first, last, and constant obligation of legal-policy decisionmakers ought to be to do no harm to pursue an ethic of responsibility
for consequences rather than an obsession with ultimate ends.273

273. See generally Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER:
ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 77, 120-21 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds., 1946)
(distinguishing these two modes of political activity).

